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Abstract 
In 2002, at the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) a plan 
emerged to restore the approximately 60% of global fish stocks, which have been fished to the 
brink of destruction, to biologically sustainable levels by 2015. This plan was made in an 
attempt to secure greater food security for many of the world's people. However, severe 
Illegal Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing in many of the world's fisheries makes the 
realisation of such a plan difficult, especially in the developing context where there are little 
means for regulating ocean fishery usage effectively. This dissertation examines the nature of 
IUU fishing, and attempts to find possible solutions to this pervasive problem for many 
coastal states in the developing world. The methods employed by the study comprise a review 
of literature pertaining to both theoretical and practical dilemmas, as well as a more focussed 
examination on IUU fishing in Senegal. Using a process of inductive analysis the case is 
contrasted with the theory in view of finding routes to improved resource exploitation 
mechanisms in the region. The study concludes that the global over fishing crisis may create a 
window of opportunity for developing countries in possession of such resources to better 
manage their fisheries and take advantage of possible comparative advantages in international 
trade in fish products, thus improving balance of payments problems. However in order to 
achieve this, as a first measure the problem of IUU fishing must be eradicated. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction. 
1.1. Coasts in Crisis. 
Mbour is a fishing village SO miles south of Dakar on the Africa's West coast. Traditionally 
much of the nutrition for the inhabitants of this town has come from once rich fish stocks near 
the shore. Since the advent of massive foreign fishing enterprises off Africa's west coast, fish 
populations have begun to dwindle to the extent that local fishermen have been forced to spend 
as long as three days or more at sea in order to satisfy their needs. Cheik Gueye, 16, was one 
such fisherman. He had set out to sea with six other fishermen for three days in search of once 
plentifiil fish stocks. During one of the long nights spent by the fishermen sleeping curled up on 
piles of oily nets, a massive industrial trawler, fishing inside the area reserved for artisan fisher-
men, ploughed through the small wooden pirogue. Cheik Gueye had fastened himself to the 
boat with rope so that a freak Atlantic wave would not topple him overboard. His colleagues 
said that as the steel hulled trawler splintered their boat, Cheik disappeared under the water and 
never resurfaced. 
Arona Diagne, the president of the Senegalese independent fish workers' association, (CNPS). 
points out that over the last two decades the lives of more than 300 fishermen have been lost in 
similar incidents in the waters around Mbour. 
The Mbour fishermen rarely know where the boats responsible for the accidents come 
from. Often they are fishing illegally inside the area reserved for the artisan fishermen, 
but the boats cover their identity numbers in mud. They turn off their lights so they can-
not be seen from the shore at night, with the inevitable result that they cannot see the pi-
rogues either. According to the local fishermen, when the accidents happen, the trawlers 
never stop.1 
Incidents such as this one are becoming alarmingly characteristic of the competition between 
artisan and industrial fishing operations in fisheries plagued by large-scale pirate fishing enter-
prises. The United Nation's (UN) Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) has identified the 
phenomenon of pirate fishing as "illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing''.2 However, this 
definition may require extending to include the illegal or irresponsible practices of licensed fish-
ers. Fishing without authorisation, failing to report catches or failing to report catches accu-
rately, and fishing in a manner contrary to authorisation threatens responsible fisheries manage-
1 Brown, P. (2002) Summit agrees deal to save fish. www. guardian.uk. 
2Notes on IUUfishing, www.somaliwatch.ore. 
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ment.3 In this dissertation the case of the pirate fishing problem in Senegal shall be used to de-
scribe some of the important challenges associated with the regulation of fisheries in the devel-
oping world, where the problem of pirate fishing is prominent. The research aims not only to 
describe the key issues but also to develop a generalizable theoretical model which may be used 
as a road map for the formation and implementation of effective policy controls for a more sus-
tainable international fishing regime. 
This dissertation contains six sections. The first section introduces the reader to the problem, 
the research methodology and the hypothesis of the study. The second section informs the 
reader of some of the contextual issues pertaining to the problem of IUU fishing and enhance an 
understanding of the nature of the human relationship with the natural environment and its re-
sources. This section also aims to make a case for further examination of, and action against, 
IUU fishing. The third section analyses the existing literature pertaining to the research topic. 
This literature review begins with by outlining some of the literature having a bearing on the 
theoretical causes behind IUU fishing, but later moves on to present several of the existing theo-
ries for regulating fishery usage as well as describing more explicitly some recent plans which 
attempt to deal with the IUU fishing dilemma. The literature review ends with a description of 
how this research will contribute to the existing body of knowledge apropos IUU fishing. The 
author makes a case for this research as a piece which marries economic and political theory to 
the more specific and practical problem of tempering the prevalence of fishery mismanagement 
The fourth section describes some of the practical considerations concerning the inefficiencies 
associated with pirate fishing and, more specifically, how these inefficiencies bear upon the 
Senegalese ocean fishery. The fifth part offers a new model for regulating ocean fisheries in the 
global South (also refered to as the political South) where funds and impetus for regulation are 
in short supply. This model is based on aligning the true economic costs of fishing with the 
amounts paid by fishers to exploit fishery resources where the aligning of these two factors in-
volves an increase in the cost of fishing. By applying the model to the case of the Senegalese 
fishery, the aim has been to show how a mechanism for providing accurate information pertain-
ing to fishing activities may empower policy makers to not only run fisheries more effectively 
but also to take better advantage of a comparative advantage in the production offish re-
3 Bray, K. (2000) Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing, www europa.cu. 
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sources, thus improving the position of certain less developed states in the system of interna-
tional trade. The concluding chapter discusses the arguments made within the thesis with re-
spect to the implications of an increase in the price offish for the peoples of the developing 
(meaning Third) world as well as some of the challenges associated with achieving a multilateral 
response to the global fisheries crisis. 
1.2 Research Methodology. 
Post-modern theorist, Stanley Fish, has argued that there exists a cleavage between theory 
and its practical application, which is so great that it is sometimes scarcely worthwhile to be-
come embroiled in elaborate theoretical endeavours.4 The findings of this research, however, are 
deeply rooted in theory. There are two main reasons for this. The first is that as an academic 
thesis, it must adhere to the discursive norms of the academic process. There can be little doubt 
that this process requires certain obligations to be met in terms of foundations in the relevant 
schools of thought and, at least, a basic knowledge of those that may seem less relevant at first 
inspection. The second reason emerges as a result of the instrumental usefulness of theory as a 
means to sketching dilemmas and ways of deconstructing them. This is done to better under-
stand the nature of specific problems, and indeed the best route towards repacking problems to 
create better problem solving systems and more gratifying status quos. 
Fishery regulation and the concomitant dilemmas are a field in which some fine academe has 
yielded some interesting and credible works regarding approaches. Not only have theorists of-
fered economic models and the means for understanding and addressing the challenges associ-
ated with fishery resource use, but they have also outlined some of the causes of these problems 
through the use of rational choice and game theories relating to common property resources. 
However, as Elinor Ostrom has argued, policy mandates on common pool resources have been 
based upon theory which has not connected to the precise nature of particular problems in a 
consequential manner.3 The author suggests that thus far theoretical approaches have been 
somewhat too limited to provide the best possible approach to resource management, thus cre-
ating a need in the field for theories which can speak more eloquently to the prescriptions man-
4 Fish, S. (1989) Doing what comes naturally: change, rhetoric, and the practice of theory in literary and legal stud-
ies. Durham, NC, Duke University Press, p 4. 
5 Ostrom, E. (1990) Governing the commons. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p 7. 
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dated by the specificity of particular problems. Furthermore the problem of pirate or IUU fish-
ing has not yet been addressed by academics in a comprehensive way. Thus one of the key chal-
lenges for this research is in finding a credible research methodology in the absence of a grand 
bank of literature pertaining to illegal fishing. As a result, the following methodology has been 
chosen as the finest means available for synthesising an academically credible and practically 
useful thesis on a little researched topic. 
The key points of departure for this work have been informed by a theoretical framework which 
is characterised by three core and cross-cutting theoretical discourses: ecological preservation-
ism, development economics, and fishery economics. From this base, the analytical framework 
comprises a literature review, using inductive anaylsis to answer descriptive, theoretical, and 
conceptual questions which emerge from the various primary and secondary sources consulted.6 
Primary sources include official government and non-government organisation documents, 
while the secondary sources include books, newspaper articles, journal articles, news reports, 
and interviews. Data collection has therefore been restricted to the already generated data con-
tained within these texts; thus one of the limitations for the study has emerged as a result of the 
lack of comprehensive primary data in the form of survey results. In an attempt to provide for 
Ostrom's specificity related concerns, the case of Senegal's offshore fishery has been chosen as 
a means for overlaying the literature with a real world experience. The particular case of Sene-
gal's offshore fishery has been chosen with respect to the objectives of the study, which are to 
provide insights into possible solutions for an IUU fishing problem in a Third World state fish-
ery characterised by Flag of Convenience (FOC) fishing enterprises and conflicting user group 
interests. The case of the Senegalese fishery bears all of these necessary hallmarks and may be 
classed as a country case study.7 Literature review and case study techniques have not only been 
chosen for the purpose of triangulating the research problem with the aim of providing a new 
model for fishery regulation but also as a means of being reflexive upon the model by testing it 
against possible inadequacies. 
The first objective for the study is to outline the problem of illegal fishing by way of a review of 
current and past events literature. This will form the basis of the problem statement and, there-
6 Mouton, J. (2001) Haw to succeed in your masters and doctoral studies. Pretoria, Van Schaik. p 179. 
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fore, the justification for the research which will include a theoretical framework explaining the 
need to protect environmental resources. Second is conceptualisation of the problem within the 
relevant literature pertaining to fishery usage. This section will be characterised by a review of 
literature pertaining to IUU fishing problems while the causes of IUU fishing are outlined in 
terms of rational choice theory. Later in this section, some economic approaches to fishery 
management will be outlined for the purpose of providing the reader with a frame of reference 
for the later parts of the thesis where economic approaches to the problem of pirate fishing are 
used to formulate a new model for the regulation of fisheries characterised by IUU fishing. The 
third aim of the research is to provide a new model for dealing with the problem of IUU fishing 
within the developing or Third World context. The new theoretical framework for the manage-
ment of fisheries is achieved via conceptual analyses. This model has been tested for credibility 
through its hypothetical application to the real world case of Senegal's fishery, using hypotheti-
cal figures and real world circumstances as the basis for this experimentation. 
Although these three basic aims form the core of this thesis, some auxiliary sections have been 
included to verify and legitimate the findings in the core sections, as well as to provide the 
reader with some background knowledge regarding the following topics: the historical context 
from which progress is desired; the need for, and reasoning behind, environmental preservation, 
the international experience regarding fishery issues thus far, as well as how the literature bears 
upon the real world circumstances faced by the Senegalese fishery. 
In the final sections of this thesis, recommendations and a conclusion will be made bearing upon 
the findings that have emerged in the previous sections. 
A process of peer review has been employed as a means for enhancing the credibility, validity, 
and reliability of the research methodology. 
13 . Hypothesis. 
New market-based estimations regarding the economic costs associated with pirate fishing 
can provide the framework for the formulation of policies which will enable more effective 
7 Babbie, E. & Mouton, J. (1998) The practice of social research. Cape Town, Oxford University Press, p 281. 
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regulation of fishery resources in developing states. By informing a more accurate price offish, 
and increasing the cost of fishing through policy measures in tune with this market information, 
fishery resources may play a pivotal role in the development of coastal states in the Third 
World. This objective may be achieved through reorganising institutional arrangements in view 
of giving localised fishing operations a comparative advantage in the production offish prod-
ucts, which in turn can provide a necessary medium for improving balances of payments in 
Third World states. 
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Chapter 2. Background to the Study. 
2.1. Humans and the Natural Environment 
The cleavages between social behaviour, economic development, and environmental degrada-
tion are ones which have historically demanded philosophical discussion. The central issues per-
tain to the paradoxical relationship existing between human and or social welfare and the wel-
fare of the natural environment upon which the well-being of almost all living things depends. It 
may be useful to place attempts at evaluating and alleviating environmental damage within a 
theoretical framework demonstrating the relationship between humans and the natural environ-
ment as a pretext for such preservationist endeavours. Traditionally environmental action has 
been based on often-conflicting ideological positions. Reparative environmental action has theo-
retical foundations based on two complementary schools of thought. Conservationists view 
environmental resources in terms of their instrumental usefulness, which provides justification 
for the stewardship of humans over the environment. Preservationists, on the other hand, view 
the environment and its natural resources as being intrinsically valuable for their beauty, and 
inherently precious simply because they exist.8 
Within these doctrines, the human obligation to the natural environment falls under three broad 
principles known as stewardship, utilitarianism, and the significance of life. Stewardship is 
based on principles which suggest that humans are stewards of the environment and, as such, 
not only have the right to exploit its resources but also a duty to protect them. Utilitarianism 
bases the human obligation to the environment and its inhabitants upon a responsibility to ad-
vance the greatest good for the greatest number. This doctrine requires humans to take stock of 
the interests of sentient non human beings while conducting themselves within the earth's habit-
able spaces. The significance of life principle acknowledges that life, sentient or not, is precious 
and must be revered. This notion is indelibly associated with the work of Albert Schweitzer who 
recognised that the natural environment, living and non-living, forms crucial life supporting 
networks for other living things, and should be preserved for respect and veneration for life.9 
The problems associated with over fishing are precariously balanced between these principles. It 
8 Connelv, J & Smith, G. (1999) Politics and the environment London, Routledge, p 9. 
9Ibid,ppll-18. 
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is virtually impossible to make reliable assumptions about the harvesting offish products rela-
tive to utilitarian principles as a result of the difficulty that one is likely to encounter in attempt-
ing to aggregate net welfare of the planet's species relative to the act of over fishing. The stew-
ardship and the significance of life notions appear to offer more applicable foundations for the 
disciplined employment offish resources, as both of these principles are overtly opposed to the 
annihilation of namral resources and other species. Hence, concepts of sustainable resource use 
are founded upon principles which not only stress the rational need to conserve useful resources 
but also a view which appreciates other things as having a birthright to their own place in the 
universe. 
2.2. A Legacy of Plunder. 
The colonisation of Africa came hand in hand with economic structures and discourses that 
reflected hegemonic power structures between colony and colonial master. Before the 1940s a 
predominant view was that economic development in West Africa would be the product of co-
lonial development in the region and associated welfare programmes.10 Later, during the period 
between the 1940s and 1950s capital investment and the expansion of production in West Af-
rica was viewed as trumps for ensuring the developmental hopes of the region. Unfortunately, 
problems with insufficient economies of scale gave the new Africa-based producers a compara-
tive disadvantage in the production of secondary products when they attempted to compete 
with massive operations in already industrialised countries for a slice of the world market. This 
problem led to the current situation, with West African states trading primarily in raw material 
exports, the only viable alternative for their infant economies.11 Hence, Africa became a source 
of primary products which could be imported and processed by western powers. Although the 
African continent provided much of the raw materials required for a developing global econ-
omy, the economic benefits were somewhat meagre in relation to those received by the colonial 
powers.12 As Senegalese theorist, Boubacar Barry, has suggested, neo-colonial discourses, par-
ticularly in Senegal, are the result of pre-colonial power arrangements.13 As such, these dis-
courses have become entrenched into the power relations that determine, to some extent, the 
10 Rimmer, D. (1984) The economies of West Africa. London, George Weidenfield and Nicolson. 
11 Ibid, p 216. 
12 Jones, A. (2003) Personal communication. Interview with A. Jones, February, Pietermahtzburg. 
13 Rimmer. D. (1984). Loc cit. 
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country's posture in the international political economy.14 To this day, these modalities are per-
petuated by economic power relations, which appear to be inhibiting the economic development 
of many developing countries.13 Many African states currently spend a large portion of the in-
come earned from the sale of natural resources on debt servicing. Senegal, for example, is in-
debted to the World Bank to the tune of $3.8billion. In 1999 this country spent $323 million 
servicing this debt, which incidentally, is $311 million more than the European Union (EU) paid 
in the same period to exploit one of the country's few natural resources, their fishery.16 To add 
insult to injury, many of the fish products extracted from Senegal's fisheries are processed in the 
west and sold back at an inflated price just a few miles from where they were caught, doing 
more damage to the state's already precarious balance of payments.17 
Fish are not only an important commodity for global trade, but form a staple part of the diet for 
85 percent of the Senegalese population as well as providing employment to massive sectors of 
the country's work force. The artisan fishing industry employs over 10 percent of the popula-
tion of Senegal (approximately 600 000 people).18 With water shortages in much of the interior 
of the country retarding agricultural activities, people migrating to the coast in search of un-
common jobs are often compelled to begin fishing for food and to make money, thus adding 
additional pressure to an already overburdened resource.19 As African fish stocks dwindle, local 
fishermen are not only losing their lives but also their livelihoods. Since catches have decreased, 
economic pressures have increased, and social fragmentation continues to develop as a result. 
Aside from the social and economic impacts of this over-fishing, the environmental conse-
quences are enormous, as ironically the use of Senegal's precious resource appears to be rein-
forcing underdevelopment rather than stimulating economic growth. 
With the rapid depletion offish stocks in Europe and Asia, trawlers from France, Spain, Italy, 
Taiwan and several former Soviet republics have targeted the waters off the west coast of Af-
14 Batiy.B. The subordination of power and the mercantile economy, in Cruise O'Brien, R. (1979) The political 
economy of underdevelopment. London, Sage. 
15 Frieden, J. (2000) International investment and colonial control, in Frieden and Lake. International political 
economy. (2000). London, Routledge, p 110. 
16 Wilson, J. (2000) op cit. 
17Locrit 
18 Op cit, p 2. 
19 Notes on Senegalese fishery dilemma, www.guardian.co.uk. 
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rica to satisfy their countries' appetite for fish products. The fish they hunt in Senegal are mainly 
migratory sardines, which swim up and down Africa's west coast passing through the territorial 
waters of Mauritania before reaching Senegal. The migratory behaviour of these sardines means 
that over-fishing in one area can lead to the collapse of an entire population upon which people 
and animals in many, often far off, regions depend. Problematically, the regions where the regu-
lations are most lenient are also the ones which are favoured by large fishing enterprises,20 hence 
the incentives for countries with fishery resources to implement rigid policy controls are dimin-
ished by the desire to entice foreign fishing companies to their waters for the sake of the quasi-
lucrative fishing deals that accompany the trawlers. In 2000 the EU had an agreement with the 
Mauritanian government allowing 22 trawlers of unlimited capacity to fish the local waters. The 
main beneficiaries of the deal have been the Dutch pelagic fleet and its new fleet of "super 
trawler" - 144 metres long, roughly the size of a cross channel ferry, capable of carrying 7 000 
tons offish 22 000 miles.21 
Another deal allowed 78 EU boats to fish the Senegalese coast for an annual sum of 7.5 million 
pounds. Although the EU has stated a commitment to sustainable fishing practices, the fisher-
men in Senegal say that the enormous appetite of the foreign trawlers is annihilating the local 
sardine population.22 More recently in 2002, after banning EU boats from their waters for six 
months, the Senegalese government managed to land a more favourable fishing deal with the 
Europeans. The new deal emerged as the result of unhappiness among the Senegalese about the 
unwillingness of the EU to compensate them sufficiently for the use of their fish resources. In a 
four year deal worth 64 million euros, the Europeans have agreed to: pay 16 million euros an-
nually (4 million less than the Senegalese had demanded but 4 million more than the previous 
protocol); increase the number of Senegalese fishermen to be employed from 33 to 50 percent; 
decrease the quantity of demersal fish (species living near the sea bed) caught from 10 000 
Gross Tonnes (GT) to 8000 GT (in the interests of the artisanal fleet); and cease to employ the 
environmentally catastrophic pelagic fishing techniques. Two of the additional innovations of 
this new agreement are the implementation of a 2-month biological rest period for helping fish 
stocks to replenish, and the installation of observers on board EU vessels to help Senegalese 
20 Ulph, A. (1999) Trade and the environment Northampton, Edward Elgar, p 198 
21 Wilson, J. (2000) Loccit. 
22 Ibid 
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authorities monitor the deal.23 In spite of these measures though, environmentalists remain con-
cerned that the deal is not sufficiently aligned to the ecological capacity of the fishery.24 These 
concerns become particularly alarming when consideration is given to the incidence of pirate 
fishing in this industry. Pirate, or FOC vessels, are believed to originate from about 80 different 
countries, but most come from Taiwan, the EU (mainly Spain), Panama, Belize, and Honduras. 
The owners of the ships typically pay a fee to have their vessels registered in a country that has 
not ratified (and is therefore unbound by) the relevant international treaty agreements pertaining 
to fishery usage. This enables these boats to roam the high seas, fishing wherever and whenever 
they please under the protection of the sovereignty of the state where the ships are registered. 
Estimates suggest that over 75 percent of all pirate vessels are registered in Honduras, Panama, 
Belize, St. Vincent, or the Grenadines.23 Thus for a small fee pirate fishing companies can re-
move millions of dollars worth offish from virtually wherever they see fit.26 Taking advantage 
of this loophole in international law and disguising their fishing operations within fictitious 
companies, pirate fishers are able to extract fish from the oceans without paying any compensa-
tion for the use of the fishery, and in many cases without being identified. Even when such in-
dustrial trawlers are identified while fishing illegally, they are seldom penalised. T h e industrial 
boats are very powerful with a lot of money and they can buy their way out of trouble. They 
corrupt the persons who are meant to stop them. The bribe is everything."27 As the latest fishing 
deal between the EU and Senegal allows little or no room for additional exploitation of Sene-
galese fishery, the prevalence of IUU fishing in the area may pose a major threat to the longev-
ity of this fishery. 
Although the UN's FAO has recognised pirate fishing as a major threat to the sustainability of 
the world's fisheries,28 the eradication of this phenomenon remains a politically contentious is-
sue. A plan emerged at the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development to restore 
60% of the world's fish stocks by 201S. A total of 189 countries ratified the part of the plan 
which involved creating protected zones, while only 130 ratified the section which attempts to 
23 VIest African fishery news, www afrol.com. 
24 Ibid. 
25 \uvvv.oneworld.org. Loc cit 
26 Ibid 
27 www .guardian.uk. Loc cit 
28 www .8omaliwatch.org. Loc ch. 
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arrest and penalise pirate fishing vessels (ships that are fishing outside of their designated juris-
diction).29 Indeed the failure of 59 states to mandate the penalisation of pirate fishing is alarm-
ing. Although one should be cautious about drawing rigid conclusions about such statistics, it 
does not seem unreasonable to conclude that many states are primarily concerned with advanc-
ing their own interests to the detriment of disenfranchised peoples who depend heavily upon fish 
stocks for their well being. Yet in an ironic 3estalt shift many vulnerable states such as Senegal 
can scarcely afford to regulate their own fisheries without international cooperation.30 Given 
that only 130 states ratified this section there is scope for truly devastating pirate fishing opera-
tions, especially when we consider the fishing and storage capacity of modern vessels. Regard-
less of so called sustainable development reforms, the existence of a demand for scarce fish re-
sources leaves a supply deficit, which appears to be all too easily satisfied by politically below 
board fishing practices. Hence the old patterns of core periphery exploitation appear to be per-
petuated in spite of modern endeavours for reform, thereby reinforcing the impetus for regulat-
ing the fishing industry in order to avoid gross exploitation of these precious resources 
2.3. Cost Associated with Pirate Fishing. 
The numerous problems associated with illegal and unregulated natural resource use may 
seem obvious, though the solutions are not. Key challenges related to attempting to police re-
source use are prominent in attempts to standardise resource usage among users of fisheries. 
Operating without quota restrictions, and unaccountable to any authority, pirate fishing has se-
rious ramifications for the future well-being of global fish stocks.31 Unregulated fishing has thus 
far devastated fisheries to the detriment of those who rely upon their bounty for meeting their 
own basic needs, as well as large organizations with legitimate fishing licences. So great is the 
perceived threat that the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (UNFAO) has be-
gun developing an international plan of action (IPO A) to combat IUU fishing. To date, how-
ever, progress has essentially been limited to the development of the new plan of action, with 
several papers having been commissioned for a global review of the problem, and several meet-
ings having been held on the key and related issues.32 The challenge is important and may affect 
one because the threats associated with IUU fishing not only affect the economic interests of 
29 Brown, P. (2002) Summit agrees deal to save fish. The Guardian, p 1. 
30 www.oneworld.org. Loc ch. 
31 Wilson, J. (2000) Loc ch. 
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large fishing companies and governments, but have a direct effect upon the lives of millions of 
ordinary people. 
Although the magnitude of the decline of Senegal's fish stocks is difficult to gauge, interviews 
with local fishermen suggest that the fish population has decreased to the extent that what could 
once be caught in one afternoon now takes three days or more.33 Greenpeace, on the other 
hand, has estimated that a global figure of 27 million tons of by-catch alone is dumped back 
into the sea by pirate fishing vessels annually. Of the estimated 1300 industrial scale pirate fish-
ing vessels world wide 345 are believed to frequent the waters in and around Senegal, removing 
massive quantities offish and placing additional pressure on this over burdened natural re-
source.34 Even the most conservative of estimates suggest that the pirate fishing is a serious 
problem. Suppose that half of the FOC fishing vessels suspected to frequent the waters around 
Senegal (345/2), fish once in a fishing season, and at half the capacity per outing of the large 
industrial trawlers licensed to fish Senegal's oceans (14000GT/2). We may now extrapolate a 
simple equation for a conservative figure regarding the amount offish which may be removed 
illegally each season from Senegal's fishery. By multiplying the number of vessels number by the 
gross tonnage removed per outing, we can calculate the total tonnage poached. Thus 345/2 
vessels x 14 000 GT =172.5 x 7000GT which gives us a figure of 1 207 500GT of illegally 
caught and uncounted fish. When compared with the volumes offish removed by legal fishers, 
these estimates become even more alarming. Recent reports suggest that in terms of the latest 
fishing deal between the EU and Senegal, the EU nets 6 000 000 tons offish per season while 
the Senegalese land 9 500 tons. At a conservative estimate then, pirate fishers may be removing 
15 percent, or more, of all fish caught in Senegal's waters per season, and placing the resulting 
fish products in markets all over the world. This, needless to say perhaps, drives the market 
price offish down, forcing legitimate fishers to fish harder for lower rents, thus placing addi-
tional pressure on global fish resources, and particularly in those places where regulations are 
easy to ignore. 
The result of the depletion of these fish populations will surely become costly to the govern-
32 Bray, K. (2000) IllegalUnreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, www eurona.eu. 
33 www.guardian.uk. Loc ch. 
34 Notes on international fishing dilemma. (2001) www.commondreams.ori:. 
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ments which depend upon big fishing deals for revenue as the value of the licences diminish in 
proportion to the destruction offish stocks. Yet the true, and most profound cost of pirate fish-
ing is to make fish resources incredibly difficult to regulate. While in the long term pirate fishing 
not only wreaks havoc for artisan fishing communities and the fish stocks themselves, but may 
have dire consequences for lucrative international trade arrangements as well as primary, secon-
dary and tertiary industries. This is without making mention of any of the implicit consequences 
of the virtual eradication of various oceanic species. 
Indeed the solution to over-fishing problems may now appear simple. Clearly what is required in 
these areas is an effective coastguard such as those presiding over some Canadian fisheries, un-
fortunately many African states, faced by an over fishing crisis, can scarcely afford such luxu-
ries. Over fishing is costly to police, and the predominance of free trade arrangements makes 
demand side moratoria for restricting the demand for fish products similarly unviable. Hence it 
is difficult for countries to exclude certain products from their import bills for reasons of envi-
ronmental prudence without contravening certain free trade agreements. Although environ-
mental prudence has become a more prominent feature of international trade regimes, these 
measures appear to have been somewhat incomprehensive when it comes down to providing 
easy solutions for more effective fishery management, and the prohibition and regulation of ille-
gal fishing. In fact, and in counterpoint, the phenomenon appears to be growing.33 Furthermore, 
many states are somewhat obstinate on issues concerning trade and environmental prudence.36 
The well-being offish resources remains important to humans, not only because many people 
have acquired a taste for fish, but also because fish products have long been hailed as a possible 
solution to global worries about food security. Moreover the demand for fish resources will 
continue to be fairly inelastic until acceptable substitutes can be produced at a reasonable cost. 
Given that developing affordable substitutes for fish products is likely to be a costly process, if 
possible at all, the impetus for establishing effective policies governing the use of fishery re-
sources remains significant and credible. However, effective environmental policies not only 
require policy approaches to particular problems but also methods for evaluating and, where 
necessary, refining these policy measures. 
35 www .commondreams.org. Loc cit 
36 www somaliwatch.org. Loc ch. 
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The evaluation of environmental policies and their implementation typically requires vast 
amounts of information, and when policies are economic, meaningful information about eco-
nomic activities such as the demand and supply functions are crucial ingredients for assessing 
the effectiveness of pertinent policies.37 The discreet nature, and large scale of pirate fishing 
makes information regarding the quantities offish removed from the ocean and sold in foreign 
places inaccessible to those who attempt to gather this information with a view to establishing 
policy controls for fisheries. The result of this lack of information makes meaningful evaluation 
and redefinition of existing policies, which have been designed to regulate fishery usage, impos-
sible. 
37 Arnold, F. S. (1995) The economic analysis of environmental policy and regulation. New York, John Wiley & 
Sons, p 45. 
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Chapter 3. Literature Review. 
3.1.0verview. 
The key issues encompassed by the problem of pirate fishing are numerous. The linkage be-
tween the necessary biological equilibrium for a well functioning fishery and the drive for the 
economically efficient and profitable utilization of the resource are at the heart of many of the 
challenges associated with attempting, not only to eradicate pirate fishing, but to manage legal 
fishing in a more biologically and economically sustainable way. Economists may be able to 
offer economic models for fishery regulation (ceteris paribus), biologists methods for evaluating 
the health offish populations, and political scientists explanations and explorations of the ways 
in which the changing usage offish resources impacts on the lives of individuals, societies and 
organizations. However, what is required is an attempt to marry the offerings of each within a 
comprehensive fishery policy programme. Effective fishery policies and sustainable agreements 
between states must be informed by a broad based approach to the numerous challenges associ-
ated with attempting to achieve these goals. Indeed fish resources are a primary global food 
source as well as a lucrative key to economic emancipation for thousands of people in many 
parts of the world, yet in practice many states in possession offish resources rarely have accu-
rate knowledge pertaining to the state of their fishery populations, the amount offish being har-
vested, the economic value of the resources being removed, or indeed by whom the resources 
are being extracted. 
Although much has been written on common property dilemmas, and indeed fishery manage-
ment, illegal unreported and unregulated fishing is a topic which has not featured highly on the 
agendas of the world's theorists. The relative literature vacuum has presented a challenge to the 
production of this thesis, and indeed to this review of literature. However, poor availability of 
literature should not be cause for abandoning such a project, but rather a good reason for pur-
suing it. Nevertheless this challenge remains to be overcome in order to contribute in a mean-
ingful way to the body of knowledge concerning the regulation of IUU fishing in the political 
South. This literature review intends to outline some of the causes of the problems associated 
with fishery regulation, to summarise certain key economic approaches to fishery management, 
to conceptualize those approaches within a system characterized by pirate fishing, and finally 
provide the basis for theoretical avenues of hope for more effectivel fishery management within 
the context of the developing state. These steps will be taken as a way of providing the reader 
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with a working knowledge of both fishery economics as well as some challenges associated with 
attempting to eradicate pirate fishing. The first two sections are intended to form the basis of an 
analytical and theoretical framework for better understanding of fishery dilemmas, while the 
third bears heavily upon international experiences and government and non-government organi-
zation policy approaches to illegal fishing thus tar. The international experience is examined 
with a view to providing a point of comparison for orienting the real-world Senegalese status 
quos relative to the theoretical foundations established in the first two sections. 
3.2. An International Tragedy of the Commons. 
Fisheries are categorised by both economists and environmentalists as depletable renewable 
resources. This means that although fish stocks can recover from exploitation, they can also be 
annihilated to the extent that they will never recover.38 In 2002, it was estimated that as much as 
60-70% of the world's fish stocks were being fished to destruction.39 Even the resources re-
quired by fish to survive are of limited abundance, and therefore the biology of fisheries is such 
that fish numbers will increase at a positive rate until a threshold population has been reached, 
but thereafter the population grows at a decreasing rate until eventually equilibrium is achieved 
and population growth equals the mortality rate.40 This means that if controlled effectively 
commercial fishing may take place in a truly sustainable manner as long as catches are restricted 
to a level where the population can fully recover from harvesting. 
Problematically, the logic which underpins arguments for restricting fishing to that level where a 
biological equilibrium is maintained is fundamentally at odds with the logic behind the tragedy 
of the commons dilemmas Since Garrett Hardin first published his challenging article titled * The 
Tragedy of the Commons' in 1968, the phrase has come to symbolise the degradation of com-
monly shared resources.41 Hardin's paper suggests that the benefits received for shared re-
sources are appreciated individually, while the costs associated with the degradation of the re-
source are shared between users. Hence in a commonly shared pasture the rational herder will 
be compelled to graze extra livestock to her own benefit, but to the detriment of her colleagues. 
Therein is the tragedy. Each man [sic] is locked into a system that compels him to in-
38 Titmberg, T. (1992) Environmental and natural resource economics.'ivA ed. New York, Harper Willins, p 304. 
39 Brown. P. (2002). Op cit, pi . 
40 Kahn. (1995) The economic approach to environmental and natural resources. Orlando, Harcourt Brace, p 269 
41 Ostium, E. (1990) Governing the commons. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p 2. 
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crease his herd without limit - in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward 
which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interests in a society that believes in the 
freedom of the commons. *2 
Certainly Hardin was not the first to notice the status quo of the tragedy of the commons, but 
his thinking has been profoundly important for understanding the nature of the individualistic 
tragedy of the commons, especially when formalised as a prisoner's dilemma game. In her pub-
lication of 1990, Elinor Ostrom artfully describes both Hardin's individualistic tragedy of the 
commons problem as well as Mancur Olson's insightful views on the free rider problems associ-
ated with attempting to achieve collective action, published in his 1965 book The logic of col-
lective action. Indeed both of these theories have influenced thinking on issues of common pool 
resource use profoundly, though Ostrom's important and different take on the matter has been 
perhaps one of the most exciting developments in the field in recent times. Searching for a new 
view on the issues surrounding common pool resource utilisation Ostrom holds: 
As long as individuals are viewed as prisoners, policy prescription will address this 
metaphor. I would rather address the question of how to enhance the capabilities of 
those involved to change the constraining rules of the game to lead to outcomes other 
than remorseless tragedies.43 
Before I describe Elinor Ostrom's approach to common pool resources, I shall do as she has 
done and provide an understanding of the thinking behind the philosophies of Hardin and Olson. 
Summarising Hardin's view on tragedies of the commons is perhaps best done by way of a sim-
ple prisoners' dilemma game. Suppose for the sake of argument, the players in this game are 
rational participants in the exploitation of a fishery resource with a limited capacity to yield 
benefits to fishers. This upper limit can be denoted by the maximum number of boats, which can 
be sustained by the fishery. This number can be denoted as B. In a game comprised of two fish-
ers, the 'cooperative' strategy can be interpreted as each fisher using Bl boats, or B2 boats for 
the entire fishery and a profit of 10 units for each fisher. The 'defect' strategy on the other hand 
is for each fisher to use as many boats as she feels that she can use while still malting a profit 
from her fishing activities. In this case both fishers will suffer a relative loss proportionate to the 
extent of the over-fishing. If fisher G limits her capacity to Bl while fisher H uses Bl + X boats, 
42 Hardin. G. (1968) Tragedy-of the commons, p 1 in Science, vol l .pp 1243-8 
43 Ostrom, E. (1990) Op ch,p 7. 
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the defector (H) obtains a surplus profit of 10 + Y - Z/2 units, to the detriment of the other (G) 
who obtains 10 - Z/2 units, as they share the costs of the misuse of the resource. Problemati-
cally in the absence of a binding contract, the dominant strategy for each player is to defect. 
Ironically when both players opt for the defect strategy, the outcome is the Pareto in optimal, or 
undesirable for both players. Ostrora notes the paradox contained implicitly within this game as 
well as other prisoners' dilemma games, where the preferred outcome for each player is 
achieved through the cooperative strategy. Paradoxically rational choice in the absence of 
communication between players insists that they both defect, thus yielding a Pareto inferior out-
come by way of an outcome that is in effect the preferred choice of neither player.44 This logic is 
at the heart of Hardin's observations as well as the enormous challenges associated with at-
tempting to regulate fisheries and other shared resources. 
Mankur Olson's argument is closely related to that of Hardin, though his work has been done in 
the field of the logic of collective action. He suggests that an individual who cannot be excluded 
from the benefits of a collective good has little incentive to voluntarily work to provide that 
good.45 Hence emerges the paradoxical problem of the free rider where rational choice may 
dictate that nobody work to provide a collective good, with the result that there is no collective 
good to be shared at all.46 Relating this view to fishery dilemmas shows that fishers are less 
inclined to contribute to the regulation of the resource, than they are to free ride off of the regu-
latory efforts of other fishers, thus producing another outcome that is the preferred choice of 
none of the participants, as nobody feels compelled to regulate the resource use. 
Ostrom has argued that it is the premises contained within these two theories apropos common 
pool resource use and effort sharing that has led to centralised government control of natural 
resources as being the predominant method for regulating the exploitation of natural or com-
mon property resources. "The presumption that an external leviathan is necessary to avoid 
tragedies of the commons leads to recommendation that central governments control most natu-
ral resource systems."47 In a similar way the author notes that privatisation has been hailed as a 
44 Ibid, p 5. 
45 Ibid, p 7. 
46 Olson, M. (1971) The logic of collective action: public goods and the theory of groups. Cambridge, Mass. Har-
vard Uniersity Press, p 2 
47 Ostrom, E. (1990) Op Cit, p 9. 
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means to eradicating tragedies of the commons by ascribing private property rights to user 
groups of various resources. In this case the onus of control and regulation falls upon those 
who own the resource. Problematically such a system of ownership may not always be efficient 
or possible. In the case of terrestrial resources, the division of land may not only be costly to 
effect and enforce, but it also increases user's risks of suffering great losses associated with 
uncertain environmental conditions. On the other hand, in the case of water resources it is still 
unclear as to what the establishment of private property rights even means.48 One of the key 
premises of Ostrom's work has been to look beyond the rivalistic logics behind the two above-
mentioned approaches and to seek out a more co-operative approach to common property re-
source use in the absence of often inefficient centralised systems of control. The author suggests 
that the challenging problems accompanying the regulation of shared resources may be over-
come by way of a binding contract between herders (users) committing themselves to a coop-
erative strategy that they themselves will figure out. Thus: 
the herders, who use the same meadow year after year, have detailed and relatively ac-
curate information about the carrying capacity. They observe the behaviour of other 
herders and have an incentive to report contractual infractions. Arbitrators may not need 
to hire monitors to observe the activities of the contracting parties. The self-interest of 
those who negotiated the contract will lead them to monitor each other and to report 
observed infractions so that the contract is enforced. A regulatory agency, on the other 
hand, always needs to hire its own monitors. The regulatory agency then faces the prin-
cipal-agent problem of how to ensure that its monitors do their own job.49 
For Elinor Ostrom this approach to resource management avoids many of the problems that are 
characteristic of centralised private ownership or government control, and indeed appears to 
offer a chance at a more efficient system of regulation through the nurturing of cooperative rela-
tionships between users. 
An important question for this research is whether it is conceivable to achieve the efficient regu-
lation of ocean fishery given the present constraints within the international system. It is impor-
tant to acknowledge that 99% of fisheries are privately owned by the states with jurisdiction 
over the water within which the fisheries exist. This comes as the result of the 1970 United Na-
tions (UN) Law of the Sea conference which led to the!982 convention giving costal states a 
48 Ibid, p 13. 
49 Ibid, p 21. 
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200-mile economic jurisdiction over all of the ocean which parallels their borders. 
Although this resolution was no doubt reached with a view to providing a legitimate framework 
for regulating the use of oceanic resources, for the developing state with little or no means to 
effect costly regulation and enforcement procedures, the advent of the 200-mile limit appears to 
be exacerbating fishery management problems rather than solving them. This worsening situa-
tion comes as the result of the absence of Ostrom type self-regulation but in the presence of the 
Hardin/Olson type impetus to exploit a poorly controlled resource. A comfortable niche for the 
pirate fisher has thus been created, not in a fishery policy vacuum, but in a monitoring and en-
forcement one. This has surely resulted from the fact that although at an international level 
property rights have been assigned for most of the globes ocean fisheries, the nature of poorly 
regulated fisheries remain common property in the sense that almost any fisher with the right 
hardware can extract benefits from the resource without being sanctioned. Hence the interna-
tional fishery status quo is such that approximately two thirds of ocean fisheries are on the brink 
of collapse, while some of the only healthy fish populations exist in territories where funds have 
been available to enforce state controls and individual property rights. Given the constraints 
associated with the imposition of international property rights apropos oceanic resources within 
the 200 mile economic zone, this research seeks to marry the role of the free market with rigid 
policy controls intended to limit the quantities offish harvested from a given fishery. Although 
indeed, as Elinor Ostrom may argue, this approach may not be the ideal, at the international 
level it appears to be one of the most realistic approaches for the time being, given the already 
entrenched institutional arrangements. Considering that the world's fish populations are in cri-
sis, the urgency of the situation prescribes as hasty a remedy as is possible, and not a long and 
complicated process of institutional change from the bottom up. Perhaps this latter challenge 
may be left to latter generations who are operating under less urgent circumstances. Thus for 
the purposes of this research it becomes necessary to outline some of the economic thinkings 
behind controlling fishery utilisation. 
The practical ramifications of the fact that in truth oceanic fish resources are subject to property 
rights prescribes that creative attempts at fishery management must be made within the bounds 
50 Simmons, I.G. (1991) Op ch, p 113. 
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set by this modality. This appears to make the possibility for complete privatisation or self-
management by user groups an unlikely scenario, at least at the international level. Thus the real 
work to be done in a practical sense is to organise relevant institutions in such a way as make 
them operate at maximum efficiency. On the challenge of fine-tuning these institutions, Ostrom 
notes: 
It is a process that requires reliable information about time and place variables as well as 
a broad repertoire of culturally accepted rules. New institutional arrangements do not 
work in the field as they do in abstract models unless the models are well specified and 
empirically valid and the participants in a field setting understand how to make the rules 
work.51 
Although many fish stocks are migratory, this analysis offish resources will still be made in 
terms of private ownership because, ultimately, what is at issue here is the illegal misappropria-
tion offish within the territory of sovereign states. Hence, the costly regulation of fisheries by 
the states that own them provides a legally feasible means of curbing pirate fishing. In cases 
where the costs of such policy enforcement are greater than the impetus for invoking protective 
procedures one is required to either boost impetus or find a way of meeting costs. This study 
seeks to do both. First through providing a method for estimating the economic costs associated 
with pirate fishing; and second through providing a framework for recovering funds from the 
industry itself for the regulation of the industry while recognising the need to constantly enhance 
and fine tune the quality of those regulatory institutions. Importantly, and as shall become 
clearer later, in order to enhance the quality and effectiveness of regulatory institutions, ineffi-
ciencies such as those created by IUU fishing must be eradicated. This forms much of the justi-
fication for this research, which aims to provide a means to eradicating this costly source of 
inefficiency. 
One may well inquire as to why it is that fishery resources, particularly in a country like Senegal 
that depends heavily upon those resources, might be managed in an inappropriate or incompre-
hensive way. Political theorists such as Jan Kooiman might argue that although the solutions to 
environmental rights issues are frequently viewed by both the public and the private sector as 
requiring intervention on the part of government, it is frequently the case that government effec-
51 Ibid, p 14 
22 
tiveness with regard to such responsibilities is low. The author suggests that there may be sev-
eral reasons for this. Kooiman argues that frequently environmental policy failures are the prod-
uct of bureaucratic inefficiencies and the inability of market measures to yield effective results. 
Furthermore, the author asserts that public sector effectiveness with regard to environmental 
policy issues normally lags behind the social and political expectations of its critics. This time 
lag may be due to a variety of reasons including the obstruction of state power by large and 
powerful institutions.53 Nicholas Low, on the other hand, argues that it is not so much planning, 
as it is the idiosyncrasies of political processes that determine the nature of policy outcomes.54 
Hence good governance, particularly with regard to environmental and natural resource rights 
dilemmas, must be viewed as a process of learning, and fine tuning of institutional arrangements 
rather than a static and strictly outcome based political process.55 These views are of immense 
importance when considering the apparent policy failures on the part of the Senegalese govern-
ment with respect to the management of their ocean fishery. This research is therefore orien-
tated by the desire to examine ways of improving and fine tuning Senegal's fishery management 
policies. 
3.3. Economic Perspectives on Fishery Regulation. 
Senegalese authorities state that in 1978 the small scale or artisanal fishing industry in Senegal 
produced 49 000 tons offish whereas in 1999 only 10 000 tons were produced by the same 
sector. The Wise Coastal Practices for Sustainable Human Development Forum (WCPSHDF) in 
Senegal suggest that this alarming decrease has been caused by the economic mismanagement 
of the fishery.56 One of the key issues for fishery economics is that there exists an apparent 
cleavage between the biology of fisheries and the economic considerations pertaining to their 
harvesting. Many of the techniques for regulating fisheries attempt to implement biologically 
sustainable levels of harvest by restricting catch levels through policies based largely upon eco-
nomic principles. However, these measures are frequently criticised for being insufficiently in 
tune with the biological equilibriums required by various fish populations for yielding a biologi-
52 van VheL M. (1993) Environmental regulation ofthebBusiness. In Kooiman, J. (1993) Modern governance. 
London, Sage Publications, p 105. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Low, N.(1991) Planning, politics and the state. London, Unwin Hvman, p 10. 
55 Kooiman, J. (1993) Op cit, p 107. 
56 Combining traditional and modern practices in fisheries /Sine-SaloumSenagal. (1999) 
www.csiwisepracuces org 
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cally sustainable fishing regime. Unfortunately the difficulties experienced with attempts to 
achieve supply side regulation form only one part of the greater challenge of achieving sustain-
able use of these precious resources. 
Viewed at a macro economic level, the predominance of global free trade appears to be worsen-
ing the situation for fisheries by inhibiting demand side controls which might be used to back up 
supply side regulations such as Open-Access and Limited-Access restrictions. Nowadays the 
prevalence of free trade arrangements seems to be an unavoidable characteristic of the global 
economics of trade. There are, however, those theorists who hold the view that liberal eco-
nomic modalities may hold the solution to problems of resource depletion. The view advanced 
by the advocates of'free-market environmentalism' challenge the fundamental notion that there 
exists significant incongruence between neo-liberal economic logic and environmental prudence. 
Here again, problems such as the 'Tragedy of the Commons' are viewed as being the affect of 
poorly defined property rights and inappropriate pricing mechanisms. According to this view the 
role of the market should be extended through employing price incentives and disincentives for 
regulating environmental resource use, rather than retarded by rigid policy controls.37 
The Hecksher Olin theory of comparative advantage states that every country exports those 
goods that use abundant and affordable factors of production.58 Hence, according to this model, 
trade liberalisation plays an emancipatory role for some states as each country exports those 
goods in which it has a comparative advantage at producing. International trade becomes a ma-
trix of exchanges between parties wishing to exchange goods, which are easy for them to pro-
duce in return for goods that are comparatively more difficult for them to produce. The great 
spin off effect of this thinking is to make international trade somewhat equitable between un-
equal partners. However, issues have become a little more complex in the real world where fac-
tors of production are shared between states. The fishery is a prime example of this, where the 
natural resource base may rest in one country, while much of the capital equipment used to ex-
tract the resource comes from another. In this case the comparative advantage depends upon 
both the property rights and the nature of the regulation apropos the use of the resource. Sup-
57 Anderson, T.L. & Legal, R.I. (199 n Free market environmentalism. San Fransisco, Pacific research institute for 
Public Policy, p 21. 
58 Williamson, J. A (2000) Globalization and inequality, past and present. In Frieden, J & Lake, D. (2000) Intena-
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posing that there exists zero, or only poorly defined property rights over the resource, the for-
eign fishing company with a comparative abundance in capital equipment for the production of 
fish products will be able to harvest fish with relative ease, and at relatively little cost. On the 
other hand if property rights are well defined but there is no regulatory infrastructure to support 
those privileges, foreign capital-intensive companies may still be capable of extracting rents 
from the harvest offish resources with relative ease, and at relatively little cost. In another sce-
nario though, supposing that property rights are well defined and regulatory infrastructures are 
effective, the comparative advantage in the production offish products would depend upon the 
nature of the regulatory framework. If property rights are assigned by way of a quota or licens-
ing system, then regulatory authorities become empowered to increase the costs of production 
for the capital intensive companies by forcing them to pay a particular sum of money in return 
for the opportunity to exploit the natural resource. This measure has the effect of immediately 
lowering the capital-intensive industry's comparative advantage in the production offish re-
sources, and serving to level the playing field between highly efficient foreign enterprises, and 
perhaps less efficient but geographically advantaged local industries. 
In essence then regulation and property rights give the owners of the resource a valuable oppor-
tunity to manipulate the comparative advantages contained within an industry. By effecting 
various licensing and other restrictions, modes of produaion can be modified in order to yield a 
greater comparative advantage in the production offish products for local fishers. Consequently 
it may be useful to investigate some of the common means of regulating natural resource and 
fishery usage. 
Economic fishery management techniques are typically supply side regulations, which require 
accurate estimates of the value of fishery resources. It is thus important to be able to calculate 
the value of these resources in order to establish appropriate enforcement costs. Pearce and 
Turner suggest that the economic value of an environmental resource can be represented by the 
following equation: Total Economic Value = Actual Use Value + Option Value + Existence 
Value.59 Actual use value denotes the value of the benefits enjoyed by those who use the re-
source directly. Option value includes: 1. The willingness to pay to preserve the resource for 
nonal political economy. London, Routledge, p 407. 
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exploitation in the future; 2. The pleasure in knowing that others derive value from the re-
source; and 3. The will to preserve the resource for future generations. Finally existence value 
acknowledges the welfare of nonhuman beings.60 Indeed this equation appears to lack credibility 
in the light of the problematic task of applying such qualitative variables as 'option value' and 
'existence value' to a necessarily more rigid quantitative process of economic valuation of natu-
ral resources. Furthermore, it may be unnecessary to establish the option value and existence 
value of a resource if it is possible to ensure its future well-being without doing so. Hence it 
appears as if 'actual use value' may be an important first port of call for valuing a resource for 
the purpose of establishing effective regulatory policies. In counter point though, James Con-
nely and Graham Smith argue that economic methods for evaluating the value of natural re-
sources are inappropriately over simplified. "Simplification leads to misrepresentation. Political 
conflict is reduced to questions of aggregating preference intensities."61 For the likes of Con-
nelly and Smith, and Jonathan Aldred, economic valuation techniques are too simple to produce 
values which are appropriately inclusive of all relevant considerations. The rationale behind this 
position suggests that the worth of environmental resources is not restricted to simple economic 
interpretations of their value.62 Hence such models are oversimplifications of the multifaceted 
value of natural goods. Economic techniques are simply unable to fully account for the intrinsic 
and inherent values of these resources in this view. Furthermore estimations such as actual use 
value cannot account for the value of resources that are not in use, or as yet have no significant 
demand or direct utility to humans. This is despite the potential future usefulness of these re-
sources.63 In spite of these considerations, it is arguable that economic valuation methods based 
upon the actual use value of fishery resources may provide a valuation technique which is capa-
ble of providing the basis for more efficient fishery regulation, at least in the short to middle 
term. This is largely owing to both the difficulty associated with assigning monetary values to 
the inherent and intrinsic values of natural resources, and the belief that appropriate policies, 
informed by actual use value estimations, can yield the model for a biologically and economi-
cally sustainable international fishing regime. Most importantly though, the fish resources being 
59 Peace, D. and Turner, R. (1999) in Connley, J. & Smith, G. (1999) Op cit, p 144. 
60Loccit 
61 Ibid, p 144. 
62 Aldred, J. (1999) Existence value, moralcCommitments and in-kind valuation, in Foster, J. (1999) Valuing Na-
ture. London, Routledge, p 233. 
63 Uzodike, N.O. (2003) Personal communication. Jury, Pietermaritzburg. 
26 
investigated here are ones for which it is possible to assign an actual use value based on the 
monetary or market value of the resource. It is unlikely to be the case that fish resources which 
are of no actual use value will be harvested by fishers in any great numbers, this is of course to 
exclude the problem of incidental catch which shall be touched on later. 
Although these somewhat abstract considerations form the basis for the development of a better 
way to fish, it is crucial to understand the finer workings of the fishery and its use. Colin Clark 
makes a strong argument for the regulation of fisheries through his clear explanation of the eco-
nomic life cycle of the unregulated open access fishery. Clark shows that unregulated fisheries 
are inclined to reach a 'bionomic' equilibrium, where revenues earned from fishing are equal to 
the opportunity cost of the activity. At this point the economic rents are almost completely de-
pleted, and fish stocks are devastated.64 This view is supported by Simmons63 and is commonly 
held in much of the fisheries literature, thus the 'boom-and-bust' cycle has become distinctly 
typical of the biology of a fishery where the initial profits from harvest far exceed those appreci-
ated during the sustainable yield phase.66 Heavy industrial overcapitalisation is apparently typical 
of the first phases of fishing in a new fishery, and unless the excess fishing capacity is removed 
once the initial reduction of the population is complete, severe over fishing is probable.67 This 
can be shown by way of a simple figure. In figure 1.1 below the population growth rate is repre-
sented as the dependent variable on the vertical (y) axis, while population is represented as an 
independent variable on the horizontal (x) axis. K shows the population equilibrium of an unex-
ploited fishery, where the mortality rate equals the birth rate, and population growth is static. 
This model, which was first developed by Schaefer, is based upon an analysis of a long-term 
average relationship between population size and population growth rates for fisheries.6* The 
graph is parabolic in nature because of the diminishing marginal returns to population growth 
associated with the size of the population. In other words, as the population size increases be-
yond a threshold point the population growth rate begins to decrease until population growth is 
static. Applying this logic to fishing practices has two key ramifications, the first of which is to 
64 Clark, C.W. Renewable resources: fisheries, in van den Bergh, J. (1999) Handbook of environmental and re-
source economics. Northampton, Edward Elgar, p 109. 
65 Simmons, I.G. (1991) Earth, air and water New York. Routledge, p 112. 
66 Clark, C.W. (1999) Op cit, p 119. 
67 Ibid. 
68 M. D. Schaefer. (1957) Some considerations of population dynamics and economics in relation to the manage-
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show that over fishing can lead to the eventual collapse of a fish population, while the other is 
to show that exploited at a constant and suitable rate, fishing may occur at a level which allows 
the fish population growth rate to equal the quantity offish removed, thus providing the basis 
for sustainable fishing. Figure 1.1 below shows the effects of fishing on an initially unexploited 
fish population, represented by K Note that both catch and growth are measured in biomass 
units and can therefore be expressed on the vertical axis of the graph. Point MSY represents the 
equilibrium position where catch and population growth rates are equal and fishing activity is 
sustainable. Importantly, any harvest level higher than this represents a harvest rate which is 
greater than the fish population's ability to regenerate itself. CI represents such an unsustain-
able catch level where the catch rate outstrips the population growth rate and thus the ability of 
the population to recover from exploitation. The fish population now experiences no natural 
growth as humans are removing a portion of the population which is equal to or greater than 
the fish population's ability to regenerate itself at this level. As the catch rate increases beyond 
the population growth rate, the fish population will begin to decline steadily and exponentially. 
The population will fell to X2 where the population size will continue to fell, but at an increas-
ing rate, as the rate of harvest is now much greater than a population size of X2 can support. In 
other words the harvest level of CI removes more fish than the population can replace by natu-
ral means, shown by C2, with the result that the population size continues to fall.69 
As has already been noted, fish populations not only have the capacity to regenerate themselves, 
but also to be harvested in a sustainable way. In figure 1.2 below every harvest level except 
Cmsy has two equilibrium populations. 
At C1 the population growth rate is exactly equal to the catch rate, and that the population sizes 
will remain unchanged for a catch rate of CI at either of the two population points XI' or XI". 
Hence this point or catch rate becomes the sustainable or equilibrium catch rate for both popu-
lation levels XI' and XI". This concept is known as the sustainable yield (SY) function, and 
becomes highly relevant for calculating a sustainable rate of harvest for oceanic fisheries. Im-
portantly, point Cmsy represents the maximum sustainable yield (MSY), as there is no popula-
tion size that can produce above this level of harvest. The concept of MSY is also critical for 
mentof marine fisheries. Journal of the Fisheries Research Board of Canada. Vol. 14, pp 669-681. 
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efforts to maximise economic rent gains from fishing in a sustainable manner 70 
Figure 1.1 Harvest and fish population growth rates. 




(From Khan, J. (1995). p 172) 
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69 Khan, J. (1995) Op cit. p 272. 
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Figure 1.2 Maximum Sustainable Yield and Equilibrium 
Catch functions for a fishery. 






(From Khan, J. (1995). p 173) 
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The logic behind the tragedies of the commons dictates that in general fishers will fish above the 
MSY level for a given fishery in attempts to maximise economic rent gains. This modality oper-
ates not only against the well-being of future generations of fishers, but also to the detriment of 
fish populations. An impetus is thus created for the formation of mechanisms designed to regu-
late the rent seeking behaviour of fishers. Kahn suggests that the best way to manage fisheries is 
by affecting a significant opportunity cost of fishing. This is done in two ways. The first, known 
as Open-Access regulations, increase the cost of fishing by placing restrictions on the numbers 
and type offish caught, the methods used, and the areas fished. Such regulations outlaw highly 
lucrative ̂ discriminate fishing, thus increasing the cost of fishing, and squeezing out competing 
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fishers until only the optimum number of fishers remain. The second method involves charging 
tariffs on fishing licences, and limiting the number of licences available. This technique is known 
as Limited-Entry and is favoured by economists as simultaneous to increasing costs of fishing, 
revenue which is earned from the sale of licences can be used to the welfare of the local econ-
omy.71 The latter method is currently being employed in parts of western Africa where limited 
numbers of licences are sold to fishing companies. However, such fishery regulation is espe-
cially difficult to enforce. "Coastlines are typically long and rugged; it is not difficult for fisher-
men to avoid detection if they are exceeding their limits or catching species illegally."72 
Thus: "Policies should be designed to make compliance as inexpensive as possible. Regulations 
which impose very high costs are more likely to be disobeyed than regulations that impose cost 
in proportion to the purpose."73 Therefore, as Tietenberg asserts, regulations should also be 
able to deal with non-compliance. Although a common approach is to sanction transgressors 
monetarily, the level of these sanctions for non-compliance must be in line with the costs of 
compliance.74 Otherwise non-compliance may become profitable. John Kahn's perspectives con-
cerning fishery management as subject to either open access or limited entry control is echoed in 
many other economic texts. The optimistic implication here is that fisheries can be rehabilitated 
beyond the initial 'boom' phase, as long as effective regulation is achieved. This model ostensi-
bly applies to the case of the West African fishery, which is evidently enslaved to the initial 
phases of this model. 
Although Kahn has advocated regulating fisheries through open access and limited entry restric-
tions in order to avoid the rigours of a 'boom-and-bust' cycle, he also suggests that effective 
fishery management requires consideration of some factors that transcend the optimal level of 
catch and effort which is so characteristic of most fishery economics literature.75 These consid-
erations concern: the incidental catch of other fish species and marine animals; the pollution of 
fishery habitats; conflicts between user groups such as commercial and artisan fishers; and inter-
71Coandy, J & Smith, G. (2000). Op at, pp 287-300 




75 Kahn, JJL(1998) The economic approach to environmental and natural resources. Orlando, Drvden Press, p 
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national cooperation regarding the harvesting of migratory species.76 This research recognises 
Kahn's worries, and aims to address the political and economic considerations concerning the 
latter two. However, in order to fully appreciate the possibilities for achieving such finite goals, 
it may be useful to interrogate the problem at a macro level. 
An important determinant of regulation costs for a fishery may be derived from the 'reservation 
price' of individual producers' production functions. The reservation price represents the 
amount that is necessary to compensate a producer for smaller future outputs or catches.77 
Hence the reservation price is an illustration of the future value offish caught today. Using this 
pricing mechanism may be instructive in assessing the value offish stocks for purposes of set-
ting regulatory catch thresholds. There are five important determinants of the reservation price 
on fish catches. 1. The interest rate is relevant because if the interest rate is low, the revenue 
from the sale offish today is small and the incentive to harvest is smaller than when the interest 
rate is high. Yet when the interest rate is high, ceteris paribus (all other things being equal), the 
reservation price is low because the incentive to withhold fish from the market is small. 2. The 
expected future price of the resource is important because if the expected future price is high, 
then the reservation price is likely to be high, and producers will be more inclined to harvest 
later rather than sooner. 3. The expected future costs of fishing are relevant because if these 
costs are high ceteris paribus the reservation price on fishing will be small. Producers therefore 
have less incentive to withhold fish from the market today. 4. The carrying capacity and maxi-
mum sustainable yield for the fishery are also important because if fishing practices are reducing 
the fish population size significantly, then the reservation price will be large. Expected future 
revenue from fishing will be small due to the depletion of the resource. S. The last important 
determinant of the reservation price of a fishery is the potential for the rehabilitation of the 
population. However the potential for rehabilitative practices to be economically feasible de-
pends on the other four considerations. Thus although the determinants of reservation prices 
may be extremely difficult to calculate they remain crucial for the efficient exploitation of fisher-
ies, through the inclusion of reservation prices into market prices.7* Hence the key to ensuring 
the conservation of fishery resources is likely to emerge from an effective method for quantify-
76Ibid,pU5. 
77 Atkinson, L. (1982). Economics, the science of choice. New Y«k, Richard Irwin. 
78 Atkinson, L. (1982). Op cit, p S9S 
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ing the determinants of reservation prices, through establishing market prices that include the 
costs associated with the depletion of the resource. Hence the increase in market price is ex-
pected to diminish the quantity offish demanded,79 and thus the quantity offish removed from 
the fishery. 
Attempts to quantify sustainable yields offish for particular fisheries have produced concepts 
such as the MSY (Maximum Sustainable Yield), which denotes the maximum amount offish 
which can be removed from a particular fishery in a sustainable way. Simmons shows that this 
concept is viewed as being fundamentally flawed because of its inability to take into account 
annual variations in fish stock sizes. A response to this problem has been to develop the concept 
known as OSY (Optimal Sustainable Yield) which attempts to account for changes in fish 
populations through combining economic management techniques with the biological 
constraints that are characteristic of fisheries.*0 Colin Clark shows how the inception of OSY 
indicators has had implications for the total allowable annual catch (TAC) for a fishery. Here 
the fishery is regulated through establishing the TAC and limiting catches accordingly. This is 
done through tracking the cumulative catch levels for the year, and closing the fishing season as 
soon as the limit has been reached. Alternatively the length of the fishing season is 
predetermined according to the capacity of fishing vessels and expected catch rates.81 
Problematically these methods perpetuate competition between fishers leading to catch levels 
being reached extremely quickly, therefore requiring the fishing season to be shortened. In 
response to this problem individual transferable quotas (ITQ's) have been developed in order to 
provide licensed fishers with taxable quotas that can be bought and sold between fishing 
enterprises.82 The results of this technique have been to improve fishing profits among formerly 
competing fishers, and to ensure that fish resources are available all year round. An alternative 
to ITQ's has been to impose taxes upon the fisher for landed catches, the effect of which is to 
tailor catch levels and to provide government with tax revenues. Forecasts of catch levels are 
necessary for achieving a biological sustainability of the resource. Thus, the tax rate must be set 
at a level which will inhibit fishing above a particular catch threshold. Problematically this 
approach requires vast amounts of scarce information pertaining to catch rates and population 
sizes. Not only docs this technique appear to be a blunt instrument for achieving the necessary 
79 Parkin, M. (1993) Economics, 2* Ed Amsterdam, Addison-Wesley, p 71. 
80 Simmons, I. (1991) Op cit, p 112. 
81 Clark, C. (1999) Op cit, p 112. 
82 Ibid, p i 13. 
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appear to be a blunt instrument for achieving the necessary results as a product of the difficul-
ties associated with forecasting, but also the benefits to fishers are extremely uncertain.*3 "In 
contrast, ITQ's can be effective provided only that the management authority has a reasonably 
accurate model of the biological resource. How to manage a fishery when even this knowledge 
is lacking is a difficult but important issue."84 
Fishery regulation is therefore made extremely difficult in the developing world where such in-
formation is scarce." While fishing companies engaging in pirate fishing off parts of West Af-
rica may be taking reservation prices and fluctuating catch levels into account for their own 
production forecasts, the states with the property rights to these crucial resources are certainly 
unable to make accurate calculations of their own regarding reservation prices. This is due to 
the discreet nature of pirate fishing practices, and the fact that the impetus for reform may be 
lacking as a result of the reality that national income accounting seldom encompasses environ-
mental degradation *" This is probably the result of environmental impacts seldom outlining 
costs in monetary terms; hence predictions about possible welfare gains and losses associated 
with policy changes become impossible.*7 Indeed one of the primary concerns for developing 
states must be to calculate welfare gains and losses associated with policy change, and to alter 
policies accordingly. Fishery policies, one would think, might be particularly important to the 
developing state as the fishing industry provides a sustainable source of food and revenue, both 
of which are of scarce supply in the political south. Hence the need to find a way to empower 
states in the ownership offish resources and to better audit the usage of their fisheries in order 
to establish effective and affordable controls is enormous. Certainly the eradication of pirate 
fishing plays a crucial role in this process, as it appears to underpin the meaningfulness of at-
tempting to regulate all other aspects of the fishery, such as determining variables like the MSY, 
OSY and indeed appropriate prices for ITQ's and tax-based sanctions. 
83Ibid.pl 14. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Simmons, I. (1991) Loc cit. 
86 Ibid. 
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3.4. Controlling piracy. 
It stands to reason that much of the impetus for addressing the problem of pirate fishing stems 
from the problem that IUU fishing undermines responsible fishery use. "When such fishing goes 
unchecked, the whole system upon which fisheries management decisions are based becomes 
fundamentally flawed."88 As Antonio Cervantes argues, this issue creates a special need for re-
search in the field of fisheries administration. Research in this field not only provides better 
methods for effecting fishery policies in practice, but may also provide important socio-
economic insights into fishery dilemmas, thus enhancing understandings of key social and eco-
nomic issues relating to fishery use, while providing improved technical expertise for expediting 
needed changes.*9 However, despite this thinking, the topic of controlling IUU fishing remains 
relatively new academic territory. What follows in this section are some of the important points 
of view and perspectives regarding this growing field of study, which are not only informing the 
development of this academic field of interest, but also international and regional plans of action 
for ensuring the sustainability of fishery resource utilisation. Importantly much of the literature 
reviewed in this section deals directly with the phenomenon of IUU fishing and its impacts. 
Doulman argues that some of the factors which contribute to the prevalence of IUU fishing are: 
the existence of excess fleet capacity among fishing companies, the payment of government 
subsides for maintaining and improving fleet capacities, high levels of market demand for par-
ticular fish products, and ineffective monitoring, control and surveillance of fishing activities.90 
These comments have been supported in Simon Cripps, Andy Oliver, and Julie Cat of s IUU 
fishing report written for the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), which highlights the same issues as 
being instrumental in contributing to the prevalence of piracy in fisheries. The authors make 
special mention of the cleavage between unsustainable fishing on both the high seas as well as 
within national jurisdiction, thus implicitly supporting arguments for multilateral cooperative 
approaches to fishery management. The authors also highlight the issue of the subsidisation of 
the industry by governments as a key contributor to over-fishing where regulations are lax or 
nonexistent91 Kevin Bray outlines some of the processes, which have emerged in response to 
88 Doulman, D.(20O0). Events leading to the elabrathon of an international plan of action to combat illegal, unre-
ported and unregulated fishing, www.europa.eu.int, p 2. 
89 Cervantes, A.(2000). The contribution of research to improve fishing control, wwvv.eurona.eu.. p 2. 
90 Doulman, D. (2000) Op cit,p 3. 
91 Cripps, S.J. Oliver, A. ft Cater, J. (2000). International aspects of the control and eradication of IUU fishing -
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these dilemmas after the development of an International Plan Of Action (IPOA) for combating 
ITJTJ fishing. The ambitious preliminary draft was developed in Sydney, and later fine-tuned in 
Rome in 2000, for adoption by the FAO in February 2001. The Rome draft proposes the fol-
lowing key measures for combating the core problems apropos IUU fishing: 
• The more effective implementation of relevant existing international instruments and the 
ratification or acceptance of, or accession to, such instruments by states that have not 
yet done so. 
• The more effective implementation of flag State responsibility for fisheries conservation 
and management, including greater transparency in fishing vessel registration systems 
and records, particularly of the beneficial owners of such vessels. 
• The control of "nationals" (natural and legal persons) so as to prevent and deter them 
engaging in IUU fishing. 
• Strengthened port State measures, including the development, bilaterally and multilater-
ally and within relevant fisheries management organizations, of compatible measures for 
port state control of fishing vessels, including measures for dealing with suspected in-
fringements of these port State controls by such vessels. 
• WTO-consistent multilateral trade-related measures (based on those developed in the 
International Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
(CC AMLR) and the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Blue fin Tuna 
(CCSBT). 
• Improved fisheries databases and information systems, and enhanced data exchange. 
• Strengthened regional fisheries bodies. 
• The implementation by States of national plans of action to give full effect to the IPOA. 
• Improved cooperation between States to combat IUU fishing. 
• Assisting developing countries as appropriate to combat IUU fishing.92 
Importantly, the realisation of the goals set out in the Rome IPOA requires a combination of 
legal instruments, enhanced communications and data exchange between international organisa-
tions, practical surveillance and control mechanisms, and market incentives in order to address 
the problem effectively. While the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea's (UNCLOS) provi-
sions relating to the conservation and management of straddling stocks and highly migratory 
stocks provides a framework for tackling the issues.93 
Having viewed the approaches to an IPOA for combating IUU or pirate fishing from a macro 
level, it may be useful to assess the more micro concerns for the implementation of these macro 
plans. There exist an array of important and sometimes more practical considerations to be met 
an NGO's perspective. www.europa.eu.. pp2-3. 
92 Bray, K. (2000) Op ctt, pp 6-7. 
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if fisheries are to be managed properly. As Kevin Bray argues, with particular relevance to the 
developing context, and the need for States to manage the fisheries within their national 
jurisdiction effectively: 
Moreover, effective implementation of an IPO A to combat IUU fishing will be impossi-
ble if suitable, well trained and adequately rewarded personnel with access to appropri-
ate hardware (boats, aircraft, satellite data, communications systems, computer systems 
and networks etc) are not available nationally and (when appropriate) regionally to carry 
out the specific measures in the IPOA. In particular, developing countries have special 
needs in this regard, for human, technical and physical resources.*4 
Where, in some particular contexts, poachers may be able to move freely between the Exclusive 
Economic Zones (EEZ's) of neighbouring countries, greater regional co-operation is required.95 
Unfortunately, developing a plan of action for combating IUU fishing may be one thing, while 
finding the appropriate mechanisms for bringing such plans into effect is quite another. As so-
called 'soft law' instruments, the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (CCRF) and the 
IPOA are not required to be formally accepted by governments, as is the case for other fishery 
instruments such as the 1993 FOA Compliance Agreement and the 1995 UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement which aim to address problems associated with straddling fish stocks under the 1982 
UN law of the sea mandate. However, Doulman argues that despite the soft law nature of these 
provisions, there is a high degree of moral persuasion, encouraging States to embrace these 
instruments and oversee their full and effective implementation.96 In addition to this moral per-
suasion for states, there exist regional management of local fish populations. These bodies typi-
cally attempt to combat IUU fishing by implementing market controls which try to identify the 
origin of the fish which have been caught. Port controls, which control landings by regulating 
and monitoring activities in port, are also used. To date several important regional bodies have 
been established, and have adopted such measures, including the North East Atlantic Fisheries 
Commission (NEAFC).97 Such bodies may be highly credible and useful as a second tier to 
combating IUU in those cases where government efforts may lack credibility. Although some 
states have taken definitive action against IUU fishing, others have not which supports argu-
93 Cripps, S. Oliver, A & Cator, J. (2000). Op cit, p 1. 
94 Bray, K. (2000). Op cit, p 3. 
95 Ibid, p 4. 
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ments for regional fishery bodies. Individual State action includes: 
• Revision of national fisheries and related legislation to close 'loopholes' that permit IUU 
fishing and related activities to take place. 
• Implementation of the 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement, the 1995 UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement and the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. It has been noted that 
even where countries have not formally accepted, acceded to or ratified these legally 
binding instruments, in some instances their provisions have been implemented through 
policy changes and legislative revision; 
• Tightened flag state measures to ensure that vessels comply fully with national laws and, 
where appropriate, agreed regional arrangements, including enhanced national MCS. 
• Denial of port access to vessels known to have engaged in IUU fishing. 
• De-registration of vessels where these vessels have been reported or convicted in a court 
of law for having engaged in IUU fishing. 
• Closure of markets through the prohibition of landings where fish have been taken out-
side agreed regional conservation and management arrangements.98 
Worthy of consideration is the fact that many efforts to combat IUU fishing, particularly 
through market mechanisms, have been constrained by an international impetus toward keeping 
trade open. Thus most anti IUU fishing measures have been tempered by the need to be WTO 
compliant, while regulation of the market for fish products is urged (but no more than urged) by 
international bodies who are attempting to foster free trade while realising the need to imple-
ment market controls over certain products. 
There exist enormous tensions apropos enforcing an IPO A in an international system of sover-
eign states. Although Cripps, Oliver and Cator suggest that the UNCLOS provides a framework 
for addressing the legal aspects to managing shared and migratory fishery stocks, the challenges 
remain severe. As Bray argues: 
It has long been accepted that a country cannot be held to be in breach of regional fish-
eries agreement to which it is not party, even if its vessels fish in a manner that under-
mines the agreement. As already suggested, however, there is a case for developing new 
norms of international law in which third party free riding in internationally sensitive 
fisheries is heavily prescribed. In principle, the UN Fish Stocks Agreement could deal 
with this issue to some extent. When the agreement is in force, it will be vital to test its 
provisions against non-members of regional agreements and establish effective opera-
tional and legal practice. This will call for effective and timely regional policy coopera-
tion and coordination of MCS arrangements " 
97 Ibid, p 5. 
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Despite the clearly imperfect nature of an international legal framework for addressing IUU 
fishing problems, some success stories have emerged. In a recent report from the Republic of 
Namibia's Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources, Steven Ambabi states that since the es-
tablishment of a new fisheries compliance operation in 1992, illegal fishing by foreign vessels 
within Namibia's EEZ has been reduced to almost zero. The plan, which has been put into ef-
fect, involves the deployment of specially trained inspectors to control the off-loadings and tran-
shipment activities of fishing vessels. Inspectors have also been placed on board fishing vessels 
in order to monitor the activities of these ships while at sea. A fixed-wing aeroplane and patrol 
vessels have been utilised in order to facilitate inspections and aerial surveillance of fishing ac-
tivity. Ambabi notes that the exercise is expensive, and that their Ministry is searching for new 
ways to enforce fishery rules more cost effectively.100 This case provides a fine example of sup-
ply side control, which by all accounts can be highly effective given the necessary thresholds of 
budgetary liberties. In addition to such supply side successes, there have been some important 
developments for demand controls on fish products, which do not impinge upon the absolute 
integrity of an international legal mandate for combating IUU fishing. These developments in-
clude a partnership between the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and Unilever, one of the world's 
largest buyers offish, which has led to the establishment of the Marine Stewardship Council 
(MSC) This association is a non-profit organisation which works to ensure international re-
sponsible fisheries management through several mechanisms: 
Fisheries applying for certification under the MSC are evaluated in relation to a set of 
standards that include, sustainability; ecological protection; and legality. The MSC then 
seeks to create incentives for healthy and legal fisheries. Overall, labelling and thus 
chain-of-custody control, will lead to increased transparency of the origin of products 
and so offer the markets and consumers a choice of purchasing legally and sustainably 
caught fish and products.101 
Certainly it is likely that any effective fishery regulation regime will come from a coherent and 
broad based response. There are cases where demand side responses such as the ones outlined 
above provide crucial regulatory frameworks, as there are those that rely upon supply side re-
sponses and controls. Also important is the need to be able to effect supply side measures as the 
cornerstone of fishery management but also to prevent complications which may emerge from 
100 Ambabi, S.K. (2000). Presentation on the Namibian fisheries compliance on monitoring, control and surveil-
lance. \uvvv.europa.eu.. pp 3-6. 
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inefficiencies in more market based measures. 
The Centre of Research for the Development of Intermediary Fishing Technologies (Credetip), 
a non-government organization set up to protect the rights of artisan fishermen throughout west 
Africa, argues that the only way to achieve effective fishery regulation off Africa's west coast is 
to effect a coherent and collaborative response from African coastal states. Such plans require 
the multilateral adoption of common policies regarding fishing agreements. On 28 May 1999 
Senegal and Mauritania signed such an agreement which calls for the following measures: 
• The Coordination of surveillance efforts and management of fishery resources between 
the two states. 
• The strengthening of cooperation in scientific research. 
• The building of partnerships between professional organisations from within each of the 
two countries. 
• The Authorisation of Mauritanian and Senegalese fishermen to fish in each country's 
waters.102 
Commentators on the deal have suggested that although it is a good step towards regional eco-
nomic integration and protection of fishery resources and local user groups, concern has been 
expressed over the state's abilities to effectively monitor the use of their fisheries.103 This is 
problematic as reliable monitoring composes a crucial part of effective fishery management, thus 
the case in question confirms earlier assertions about the imperfect nature of the public policy 
process when it comes to natural resource management. Indeed the signing of this deal may be 
an important step in the direction towards a meaningful fishery administration scheme in West 
Africa; yet inputs from other, non-government stake holders will remain a critical determinant 
of policy outcomes and effectiveness. 
On the other side of the political spectrum come non-government organisations that add their 
own specific nuances with respect to plans of action against IUU fishing. Recently Greenpeace 
has offered a three-step solution to the problems associated with pirate fishing, which requires 
global co-operation. The plan urges states to agree multilaterally to: 
• Close their ports to FOC fishing and support vessels. 
• Close their markets to fish caught by FOC vessels. 
• Close or prevent companies and nationals from owning or operating FOC fishing and 
102 Mauritania and Senegal sign a fishing agreement. (1999) WAnv.dakar.com. p 1. 
103 Ibid, p 2. 
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support vessels. 
Problematically, this plan presents a solution to the problem of pirate fishing without addressing 
the challenges associated with attempting to find the economic resources, and political will that 
may be required for its successful implementation, especially in the political South. Hence there 
remains an enormous need to marry the constraints faced by developing states with the some-
what abstract offerings of international plans of action. Senegalese independent fish-workers 
authority Ben Yami outlines this tension when he suggested that a good plan for addressing the 
Senegalese fishery crisis can only emerge from another plan that addresses a complex array of 
issues such as societal concerns, development issues and the dynamism of fishery ecosystems.103 
In a 1999 publication, Conversations, which deals with the issues of international fish workers' 
rights, the Senegalese author Aliou Sail gives an example of the tuna-centred Senegalese fisher-
ies research as being insufficiently inclusive of the wide array of considerations regarding the 
different species being harvested in the region. The author argues that if research is to be made 
truly useful and applicable to a dynamic fishery, it must engender multi-species and multi-scale 
user group considerations.106 However, as Ben Yami shows, fisheries issues, especially when 
dealing with small user groups or less lucrative species, normally attract little interest from big 
business, hence diminishing the corporate impetus for conducting research and implementing 
rehabilitative schemes.107 One may argue that the nature of the cost-benefit analyses used by 
economists to aggregate net gains and losses associated with fishery usage, and thus inform 
fisheries policies, are insufficiently in tune with the true costs of the mismanagement of fishery 
resources. In this case the benefits associated with fishery exploitation are far more easily quan-
tifiable than the costs. This is the case because monetary values can be easily assigned to fishing 
deals and sold catches while the costs associated with the revenues that may be lost as a result 
of the destruction offish resources are significantly more difficult to aggregate Hence a key 
challenge for fisheries research is to provide a framework for managing these dynamic, eco-
nomically significant and politically contentious resources in a sustainable and fair way. 
After reviewing recent policy decisions on the part of the Senegalese Ministry of Fisheries and 
104 www commondreams org. Loc cit 




Maritime Transport, certain commitments to improving the state of the countries fishery, as well 
as a certain amount of policy prowess may be identified. There have been two significant devel-
opments with regard to such improvements. The first recent development of significance has 
been the signing of the 1999 agreement between Senegal and Mauritania which incorporates co-
operation between the two states in several important policy areas. This agreement allows for 
the two states to share scientific expertise, certain fishery surveillance equipment, technical in-
formation and fishery policy documents.10* As the fish stocks of the West African region tend to 
migrate between the territorial waters of the states in the region, fishery regulation problems 
become regional ones. Agreements such as these between the two neighbouring states, although 
underdeveloped, are important signifiers of an improving understanding of, and commitment to 
regional fishery problems such as IUU fishing. The second key development apropos the evolu-
tion of fishery policy mandates in West Africa comes as the result of the 2002 accord between 
Senegal and the EU. In this case the Senegalese Ministry of Fisheries and Maritime Transport 
refused to sign an agreement with the EU and banned EU fishers from fishing the country's 
territorial sea until a more environmentally friendly and economically feasible agreement could 
be reached. Although the agreement which was eventually signed in 2002 mandated no catch 
restrictions, certain of the terms under the agreement, such as the institution of larger protected 
areas, biological rest periods for fish stocks and restriction on fishing techniques,'"illustrate not 
only improved awareness apropos fishery issues, but also greater savvy on the part of policy 
players when h comes to attempting to ensure the sustainability offish resources in the region. 
Such developments are no doubt important steps in the right direction for the West African 
fishery, however, in the absence of more highly evolved policy plans and methods for auditing 
the affects of IUU fishing, the Senegalese fishery cannot be fine tuned from a stand point of 
improving economic and policy efficiency with respect to fishery resources. 
3.5. Summary. 
The introduction to this literature review notes four key concerns for fishery authorities in 
many parts of the Developing World. These concerns relate to insufficient information regard-
ing the state offish populations, the quantities offish being removed, the economic value of the 
fish which are removed, and the parties by whom fish are being taken. Insufficient information 
108 Dakarcom (1999) wwvv.dakarcom.com. Loc cit 
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in these regards, combined with the clear impetus and logic behind tragedy of the commons 
dilemmas, which prompt IUU fishing have a pathological effect on fishery policy. In the absence 
of this information, there is not only a lack of important knowledge which is necessary for regu-
lating a fishery effectively, but also as a result of incomplete knowledge pertaining to economic 
prudence behind plans to regulate the fishery, there is very little impetus for implementing policy 
plans. However, it is clear that both the theoretical and practical hardware exists for effective 
fishery control. It is also clear that in many cases poor planning and budgetary constraints pre-
vent governments from bringing these hardwares into effect. 
In essence, what is lacking in the above literature are not methods for regulating fishery re-
source use, but methods which provide a means for eradicating pirate fishing of migratory fish 
stocks where no existing structures have been designed for this purpose. There would also ap-
pear to be a massive deficit of fisheries literature with respect to the case of Senegal's offshore 
fishery. This research not only aims to contribute to the existing body of knowledge by applying 
certain theoretical considerations to the Senegalese case, but also by providing the basis for the 
implementation of such mechanisms as those which determine the health of the fish population 
and the monetary value offish products harvested from migratory fish stocks. Hence the thesis 
aims at enabling states to set prices for fishing licences that mandate the harvest of decisive quo-
tas, which take into consideration the reservation price of fishing. The point of view which shall 
be developed in this research will make it possible for states like Senegal to access information 
regarding the quantities offish harvested, as well as opening economic space for the introduc-
tion of an effective regulatory coast guard authority. Cumulatively, the two tiers of this ap-
proach not only make the eradication of pirate fishing and the adoption of effective regulatory 
policies a realistic enterprise, but also provide the basis for an approach to international trade in 
fish products which is more favourable to developing countries. By rearranging the modes of 
control over fisheries, Third World states may become empowered to use their comparative 
advantages in the production and export offish products to their own advantage, while foster-
ing a more sustainable fishery regulation regime. 
109 Afro News (2002) www .afrolnews.com. Loc ciL 
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Chapter 4. Senegal's Offshore Fishery: A Case Study. 
4.1. Pirate Fishing in Perspective. 
On the 20th Jury 2001 the Senegalese surveillance plane took off on a five-hour mission from 
nearby Conakry. After a few minutes 32 ships were detected, half of which were big black 
trawlers without names, flags, or identification. Reports suggest that the 16 unidentifiable ships 
were pirate fishing vessels, plundering the seas for precious fish and molluscs. Alarmingly only 
half of the ships detected on this day were licensed to be fishing in the waters off Senegal's 
coast.no It is not surprising then that FENAGIE suggest that not only are Senegalese fishers 
suffering as a result of IUU fishing in the area depleting fish stocks, but that in the twenty years 
prior to 2002 an estimated 300 men like Cheik Gueye had lost their lives as a result of collisions 
with pirate vessels fishing inside restricted zones. (See section 1.1 ) U 1 These figures translate to 
an average of over one dead fisher person per month for twenty years. 
Pirate or IUU fishing, defined as illegal unreported and unregulated fishing, by its very nature as 
an unreported and unregulated fishing activity creates certain problems for policy makers who 
may attempt to address particular issues pertaining to the streamlining of fishing activity within 
their jurisdiction. Naturally IUU fishing creates enormous problems when it comes to attempt-
ing to audit catch rates for the sake of determining the bionomic thresholds and population 
health offish stocks. Any attempt to conduct such streamlining projects certainly faces enor-
mous obstacles in any fishery that is characterised by more than negligible pirate fishing opera-
tions. For the purposes of this research, the best one can do to measure the severity of the IUU 
fishing taking place in Senegal is to assess the reports from local fishers who work in the indus-
try. Although, one may query the relevance of the pirate fishing problem for Senegal in the ab-
sence of statistical evidence, the lack of such evidence is itself a symptom of the problem. One 
must then be compelled to argue once more that the lack of statistics should not be a reason to 
abandon a research endeavour, but rather one for pursuing it in an attempt to solve such prob-
lems and their respective symptoms. This section aims initially to outline fishery regulation di-
lemmas and the problem of pirate fishing in somewhat simple terms using basic models. Some 
of the modalities described in these models will then be applied to the policy setting in an at-
tempt to link the abstract concepts of the models to the practical arena of public policy. Later 
110 Pirate fishing plundering the waters of West Africa. (2001) www .greenneace.org. 
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the findings of the first two phases of the section shall be applied to the case of Senegal's off-
shore fishery in order to link theory and policy approaches with practice in a more meaningful 
way. 
Having a grasp of the impetus behind the tragedy of the commons and free rider problems al-
lows us to take the next step of outidiiing how such self-interested rent seeking behaviour affects 
all players. What follows are some simple games incorporating different changing variables, 
which are designed to show how various status quos impact upon the circumstances, motives 
and behaviour of players operating in a fishery. In each figure F denotes fishers A, B and P; Q 
shows the quantity offish harvested; SC represents the shared costs associated with the fishing 
activity; and AC stands for the aggregated costs of fishing behaviour per period. 
Game theoretic fishery modalities. 
Figure 2.1. Figure 2.2. Figure 2.3. Figure 2.4. 
F A R A. K A. R A. R P. 
Q 10 10 10 12 12 12 10 10 2 
SC 0 0 1 1 2 2 1 1 
AC = 0 AC= 2 AC= 4 AC= 2 
Figure 2.5. 
F A. R P. 
Q 12 12 2 
SC 3 3 
AC = 6 
The first dynamic, shown in figure 2.1, is simple and represents equilibrium in a two-fisher fish-
ery with a maximum sustainable yield of 20 units of production. In this scenario both players A 
and B remove 10 units each without negatively affecting the future well being of the fish popu-
lation, the future well being of one another, or indeed the well being of future generations of 
fishers. Harvesting no more than the maximum sustainable yield (ceterus paribus) allows fishers 
111 Wilson,J.(2000)LocciL 
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to fish without affecting the reservation price negatively, as they ensure future returns to fishing 
effort through fishing at a biologically sustainable level. Assume that this fishery is characteristic 
of a perfectly regulated fishery, either by way of government or self-regulation. Note also that 
the regulation costs are exogenous to these models. Figure 2.2 on the other hand shows a sce-
nario where one of the two legal fishers (in this case B) defects in the absence of perfect regula-
tion. While B achieves a higher rent level through extracting additional fish, he does so at the 
shared expense of 1 unit to both himself and fisher A, while creating an AC of 2 units. Figure 
2.3 illustrates the likely scenario of short-term rent seeking in the absence of perfect regulation 
where both legal fishers extract additional units at their own, as well as one another's, cost, and 
an AC of 4 units. The next scenario in figure 2.4 illustrates a fishery where rent seeking behav-
iour of both legal registered fishers is perfectly regulated, but in the absence of protection 
against illegal unreported, or pirate fishing. Here pirate fisher P removes 2 units at the shared 
cost of the registered fishers, and at no cost to herself as a once off pirate with no long-term 
commitment to the sustainability of the resource. The final case in figure 2.5 shows the fishery 
in the complete absence of regulation. In this scenario both fishers A and B over fish, and pirate 
fisher P places additional pressure upon the resource by extracting 2 units above and beyond the 
extra units removed by the registered fishers, at the shared cost to A and B. Combined the un-
regulated fishing in this case create an AC of 6 units, and a diminished future reservation price 
for the resource. This comes as the result of the unsustainable harvesting offish, and the associ-
ated lower returns to fishing effort in future. Although these cases do not include the costs of 
regulation, it is important to note that an effective pricing mechanism for fish products must be 
one which includes the costs associated with regulating the resource, and thus the true cost in-
volved in removing fish from fisheries in a sustainable way. In this way the present reservation 
price for fish products is driven up and fishers are less inclined to over fish in the short term, 
and more inclined to plan sustainable and longer-term production functions. However, what was 
intended to be made clear by the figures above is the incentive for achieving effective fishery 
regulation, as a means to securing the future well being of fishers and fish populations in a 
world characterised by rational and self interested actors, and imperfect resource controls. This 
comes as the result of over fishing appearing to be in the best interests of even an honest fisher 
in the short term, as fishers choose the classical defect defect strategy. 
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One may now extrapolate a long-term view of the same fishery faced by the same user groups 
with the same relations between them. If one overlays the the diminishing marginal returns to 
fishing activity above the MS Y level for a fishery (as illustrated in figure 1.1 which shows the 
relationship between harvest and fish population growth rates) with rational choice games such 
as the ones above, some disturbing results emerge. Let us assume again that we have three fish-
ers, A, B and P, all of whom fish according to their own interests in the absence of effective 
regulation. However, in this game the fishers have been overfishing at their own discretion for 
some time now and the returns to their fishing efifort are diminishing. In the first case, shown by 
figure 2.6 below, all fishers continue to remove the maximum units offish. Problematically for 
all fishers an increase in fishing efifort tails to yield significant improvements in catch rates as the 
fish stock has now reached a point of decline where the fish population cannot restore quickly 
enough the amount offish removed. Let us suppose that at this new population level a catch 
rate of 12 units offish may be removed in a sustainable way. However, the fishers are com-
pelled by greed to increase fishing effort, thus fishing above the MSY for the fishery. Now, as a 
result of the smaller fish population, maximum efifort yields only 8 units offish for both fishers 
A and B while pirate fisher P continues to remove 2 units, but at a greater efifort co-efficient. 
Now 18 units offish are being removed from a fishery that can only sustain a harvest level of 12 
units. The shared and aggregate cost to the licensed fishers is now greater than the sum of the 
excess harvest as their efifort co-efficients have increased. Shared costs now equal -3 + EE (Ex-
tra Efifort) for each fisher, thus leaving aggregate economic costs at - 6 + 2EE as all three fish-
ers expend excess resources in dispensing extra units of efifort. Note that the excess efifort de-
ployed by fisher P has not been added as an economic cost to the licensed fishers, though it may 
be considered to be an economic loss in a more general way for the fishery as a whole as greater 
efifort yields lower dividends, even for the IUU fisher, thus indicating the unsustainability of the 
resource. Alarmingly, if allowed to continue such over-fishing will result in lower and lower 
catches until the fishery reaches the 'bust' phase where marginal returns to efifort are so low that 
fishing activities are no longer warranted. It is, however, difficult to know at which population 
and fishing efifort level, fish stocks may be salvageable in the presence of the distorting effects of 
pirate fishing enterprises. 
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Long-run Game theoretic fishery modality. 
Figure 2.6. 
¥ A. R P. 
Q 8 8 2 
SC 3+EE 3+EE 
AC = 6 + 2EE 
In short pirate fishers harvest fish at a lower cost compared with other legitimate fishing indus-
tries as they incur no costs connected with adhering to open access regulations, nor do they 
incur licensing costs associated with limited entry controls. The result of such a situation is to 
enable the pirate fishing practices to provide fish products at an unrealistically low cost to the 
harvester and therefore the consumer as well. The two approaches to depletable renewable re-
source management are therefore rendered impotent in the light of pirate fishing, which also 
makes the estimation of a reservation price for fishing a virtual impossibility. This comes as the 
result of the questions that pirate fishing raises for the approximation of the third and fifth de-
terminant of the reservation price of fishing. These determinants are the expected future costs of 
fishing, and the potential for the rehabilitation of the fish population.112 The expected future 
costs of fishing are unlikely to be calculable without extensive knowledge about the fishery's 
catch levels, which is information that is made unattainable by pirate fishing. The potential for 
the rehabilitation of the resource is also made more challenging as a result of the unknown vol-
umes offish removed from a given fishery by pirate vessels. Impairing the potential for estimat-
ing the reservation price of fishing for a particular fishery makes it impossible to quantify the 
economic value that will be lost to the fishery as a result of over fishing, thus making it unfeasi-
ble to set fish prices which represent the long term scarcity of this commodity in the hope of 
implementing a price-led decrease in the quantity offish demanded. Although current policy 
prescriptions in Senegal do not utilise MSY or TAC estimations at present, such figures are 
certainly important if fisheries are to be regulated in view of ensuring their sustainable usage. 
Hence the inadequacies of current policies with regard to MSY and TAC estimations should not 
diminish the integrity of arguments for eradicating IUU fishing in view of making such variables 
more easily quantifiable. The economic costs of pirate fishing therefore manifest themselves as 
112 Atkinson. L 1982. loc cit 
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an unknown set of variables that distort any predictions or estimations intended to inform the 
appropriate policies for controlling fishery usage. This is not to mention the direct loss incurred 
through the poaching of valuable fish resources. 
4.2. Piracy and Policy Inefficiency. 
Formalising policy approaches to environmental concerns inevitably requires policy makers to 
fulfil a broad range of conditions. Each policy prescription may be constrained by its own set of 
unique and often bizarre circumstances. The challenges presented for policy makers attempting 
to provide frameworks for the effective usage of fishery resources is no different. Among the 
broad range of decisions to be made are some fundamental ones relating to the general goals of 
a particular policy project, as well as the finer details of attempting to streamline policy effi-
ciency. This section deals with the challenge of fishery policy making in terms of four broad 
objectives, and three main status quos. A recent plan to improve fishery policies in Senegal 
noted the three key objectives of the policy process as 1. Secure the sustainability of the re-
source, 2. Develop the Senegalese fishing sector, and 3. Secure the interests of licensed foreign 
fleets, namely the EU fleet.113 However it may be useful to abstract these provisions and expand 
upon them in view of a longer term, and more sustainable fishery policy regime. Thus the key 
policy objectives that will be discussed here are: 1. Ensure the long-term sustainability of Sene-
gal's ocean fishery. 2. Secure the impetus for continued regulation and enforcement of policy 
mandates. 3. Create a policy framework characterised by fair treatment between user groups. 4. 
Incorporate into the policy framework the capacity for fine tuning, and streainlining the policy 
structure in future. The two main constraints which will be highlighted apropos this outline are 
the advent of the 200 mile economic zone mandated by the UN at the international Law of the 
Sea Conference in 1972, and the the difficulties linked with restricting access to Senegal's ocean 
fishery resource. Having outlined the general constraints and objectives that will be discussed in 
terms of a policy approach to the fishery crisis off Africa's west coast, various theoretical views 
will be taken into account in view of overlaying some policy theory with the practical challenges 
imposed by illegal fishing practices. 
The conceptual basis for developing adequate environmental policy programmes is well ill u s -
113 Notes on Senegalese fishery policy, www SAUP.fisheries.ubc. p 1. 
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trated by Clement Tistell's description of the importance of such policies for humans. The au-
thor notes: 
Improved conservation policies can raise human welfare and economic development 
projects can be more soundly, securely and sustainably based if adequate attention is 
given to their ecological and environmental implications. Even in the absence of eco-
nomic growth and the possibility of doom for Mankind, [sic] scope exists for improving 
environmental conservation strategies so as to raise human welfare by paying attention 
to economic principles.114 
However, given the apparently sound arguments for economic policy approaches to natural 
resource use, there remains the question of who is to mandate these prescriptions. Although the 
role of government control over natural resources can be a hotly debated topic, for the purposes 
of argument this critique has been constrained by the institutionalisation of the 200-mile coastal 
zone. According to contemporary international convention this step has assigned the responsi-
bility of coastal resource management to the state adjacent to the relevant resources and there-
fore the government in control of the relevant state. However, effective resource control re-
quires a disciplined approach. One of the paradoxes of resource control is to balance the some-
times almost limitless demand for a resource with absolute benefit.115 Indeed it may seem like 
good sense, especially to the developing state, to exploit a resource in the short term for the 
sake of improving a balance of payments, or budget defecit problems. Yet such behaviour is not 
guaranteed to yield the best overall benefit to society in the long term. Thus effective resource 
control inevitably requires significant prudence and effective leadership. In the absence of a will-
ingness to manage resources effectively some additional impetus such as international pressure 
may become necessary. For this reason in some places fishery management and monitoring typi-
cally incorporates a broad range of government and non-government actors.116 Here again, op-
timal resource control not only requires willingness, but also vast information and resources. As 
Ostrom argues: 
The optimal equilibrium achieved through following the advice to centralize control, 
however, is based upon assumptions concerning the accuracy of information, monitoring 
capabilities, sanctioning reliability, and zero costs of administration. Without valid and 
reliable information, a central agency could make several errors, including setting the 
carrying capacity or the fine too high or too low, sanctioning [users] herders who coop-
114 Tisdell. C. A (1991) Economics of environmental conservation. Amsterdam, Elaervier Science Publishers, p 
21. 
115 Ibid, p 24. 
116 Beatley, T. Brower, D. J. & Schwab, A.K. (1994) An introduction to coastal zone management. California, 
Island Press, p 61. 
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erate, or not sanctioning defectors. 
Other theorists argue for government control, and private property rights as means to establish-
ing appropriate policy approaches to resource management. According to this thinking the dif-
ference between private and public costs of mismanagement must be eradicated either through 
property rights or government intervention.m One advantage of assigning property rights is the 
creation of a market for the right to exploit the resource, this may be useful as a means to valu-
ing a resource in terms of consumer's willingness to pay access to those resources. Hence many 
economists believe that the most efficient resource use will come from market centred solutions 
because they provide an alternative method for revealing important information independently 
of frequently inaccurate government estimates. A mix of government control and property 
rights may then provide a solution by way of combining the benefits associated with government 
control and those provided by private property rights. Thus many of the important costs of 
regulating user group's activities may be accounted for through the sale of property rights, 
while much of the necessary information can be obtained from users. A crucial benefit of this 
hybrid approach is to provide for the recovery of lost social welfare through a tax or property 
rights vending system. While increasing the cost of fishing, and thus provoking a downward 
shift in supply, or change in the production offish products to a more endurable level. 
Problematically many of the fish resources harvested in Senegal also frequent the waters in ad-
jacent states. This creates several dilemmas. The first and possibly most material complication 
arising from this situation arises from the tendency of many regulations discriminating against 
states that implement rigid controls.119 Certainly much of the driving force behind policy reform 
regarding fisheries is provided by a perceived potential economic gain from the sale offish re-
sources in a sustainable way. However, as we have already seen the logic of sustainable re-
source usage is fundamentally at odds with the incentives for over exploitation of resources. 
Thus some politically contentious issues surround the competition between neighbours for dis-
tributional benefits from a shared fishery. The figure below illustrates how rigid policy imple-
mentation in one state may work to the detriment of that state in a globally competitive market. 
117 Ostium. E. (1990). Op ch. p 10. 
118 Butler, A. (2000) Environmental protection and free trade: are they mutually exclusive. In Fricden, J. & 
Lake, D. (2000) International political economy, 4th Edd. New York, Routledge. p 435. 
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The figures, 3.1 and 3.2, below feature two countries, country X and country Y. Country X 
implements policy controls, represented by the shift from initial price and quantity levels PI, Ql 
to P2, Q2, while country Y implements no regulations. The result is a downward shift in the 
supply and demand functions for fish products for country X. Now country X produces less fish 
at a higher price, while country Y maintains an unchanged production profile, lowering the 
world price, as shown by equilibrium position P3, Q3 in figure 3.2 and holding a position with 
the potential to out compete X in the world market for fish products and or fishing licences. 
In essence then the effective management of a cross border fishery requires not only policy pre-
scriptions within member states, but between them as well. Not only do the activities of fishers 
require monitoring, but also those of member states. As Dupont and Phillips suggest: "It is 
standard wisdom in the fisheries literature that substantial gains in resource rent could be ob-
tained if the fishery could be properly regulated."120 However, as the authors argue, in attempt-
ing to make policies more efficient, the rationalisation of the industry may contain unforeseen 
costs. The authors offer an empirical methodology for quantifying the distributional effects of 
fishery regulation. This research uses this methodology to illustrate that pirate fishing makes it 
impossible to assess the validity of policy approaches to fishery management bearing upon the 
broader distributional consequences of those policies. 
The empirical methodology offered by Dupont and Phillips has four steps: 
• Calculating the potential rent, which could be generated by alternative regulation 
schemes using empirical estimates of the fish harvesting technology. 
• Simulate alternative procedures for distributing rent gains, to tax payers in equal shares 
or to fishermen. 
• Using estimates of the fishing technology and accounting for the state of the labour 
market, calculate the employment and income losses associated with the regulation pro-
posals. In a low employment world, alternative employment may not be available to dis-
placed fishermen, so job losses will impose serious financial hardships. 
• Specify a decision-making criterion (e.g. to maximise the aggregate measure of well-
being of the entire population or to treat all affected parties 'fairly') and evaluate the dis-
tributional benefits and costs of alternative proposals from the chosen perspective.121 
119 Ibid, p 440. 
120 Dupont, D & Phipps, S. (2001) Distributional consequences of fishery regulations, [no place] Canadian Eco-
nomics Association, p 206. 






The effect of policy non-compliance 
in a two-country environment. 
Country X. 
SS (Supply) 2 
/ SSI 
DD (Demand) 
Q2 Ql Quantity (x) x 
Country X & country Y. 
WDD (World Demand) 
Q2 Q3 Ql Quantity (x) x 
(From Fneden, J & Lake, D. (2000). p 440) 
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Such analyses are of enormous significance to states such as Senegal which depend heavily on 
fishery resources for worker incomes as well as rent gains associated with the sale of fishing 
licences to other states. The trade-offs involved in adopting appropriate policy controls are 
likely not only to have a meaningful effect on the livelihoods of artisan fishermen but also for the 
economic development possibilities of developing states. However, in states with poorly devel-
oped coast guarding infrastructures, the impact of pirate fishing appears to distort estimations 
regarding policy approaches to fishery regulation. 
Applying the advent of pirate fishing to the policy objectives (described above as being pivotal 
to the sustainability of the Senegalese fishery) further illustrates the need to eradicate this prob-
lem if effective fishery administration is to be realised. As an illegal and unreported activity, pi-
rate fishing distorts important information for fishery policy makers, making the capacity for 
fine-tuning policies almost impossible by creating exogenous and unaccounted for variables for 
fishery managers. This in turn makes true equity between user groups almost impossible to 
achieve as fishery information is distorted and estimated MS Y levels are perverted, which in 
turn makes taking stock of harvest rates impossible to estimate accurately, and thus desecrates 
attempts to ensure the sustainable use of the resource through policy approaches. This is not to 
mention attempts at streamlining the distributional effects of certain policies. 
Hence what is required is a policy approach to the pirated fishery, which eradicates the problem 
of illegal fishing first and foremost. Thus one is compelled to fulfil the policy objectives set out 
above bearing on: 1 The fishery as a resource from which it is difficult to exclude users. 2. The 
property rights over ocean resources assigned to coastal states by the UN law of the sea con-
vention. 3. The potential for a legal system to process international disputes between interested 
parties. 
43. Policy Ramifications in Senegal. 
There can be little doubt that the fishing industry in Senegal is faced with severe problems 
accompanying the mismanagement of the country's fish resources. Problematically the exact 
nature of the fishery management inadequacies in the region is complex. IUU fishing in the wa-
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ters in and around Senegal would appear to take several forms, each requiring slightly different 
policy approaches. m On the one hand we have FOC fishers, whose entire operations are ille-
gitimate as they fish inside the EEZ's of states which have not authorised them to be there. On 
the other hand we have licensed fishers who may be using illegal methods, fishing inside re-
stricted zones, taking protected species, or exceeding recommended catch and by-catch limits. 
Although this thesis deals explicitly with the problem of pirate or rather FOC fishing, the solu-
tions to associated problems are only likely to emerge as a result of a broad based strategy for 
regulating the resource. This comes as the result of the interconnection between licensed fleets 
as a source for revenue which may be used in part to eradicate FOC fishing, and FOC vessels 
which have the ability to shift world prices for fish products downwards thus perverting the abil-
ity of legitimate fishers to earn the rent required to provide for the regulation of the resource. 
The problem is complicated further by shared nature of the resource between Senegal and it's 
neighbours, especially Mauritania. 
What follows in this section is an outline and critique of the existing agreement between Senegal 
and the EU. This agreement will be examined in view of outlining the need to streamline the 
efficiency of these agreements for the purpose of adjusting the prices of fishing licences with the 
real costs of ensuring the sustainability offish stocks in the region. Second comes a critique of 
the fishery agreements between Senegal and Mauritania. Third, an examination of the possibili-
ties for sanctioning FOC vessels as weU as licensed ones engaging in IUU fishing will be used to 
inform a framework for a more efficient management scheme. Fourth, and lastly, the author 
intends to show that despite the theoretical accessibility of excellent fisheries policies, there exist 
some profound political obstacles to implementing such plans, which may even reflect some of 
the current policy inadequacies apropos fisheries in the region. 
Despite a stated commitment to the sustainable usage of the West African fishery on the part of 
the European Union, who do the bulk of the fishing in the area, problems connected with poor 
regulatory measures in the area appear to be contributing to the systematic depletion of this pre-
cious resource. To begin with a recent study on the Mauritanian fishery shows that the amounts 
owed to Mauritania by the EU for use of their fish resources are simply subtracted from the 
122 Uzodike, N.O. (2004) Personal communication. Pietennaritzburg. 
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country's debt repayments to the EU.123 This would seem to diminish the state's real apprecia-
tion of the value of their fish as fees may be poorly adjusted and information of market values 
for fish products difficult to attain. Another study, which examines the existing deals between 
the EU, Senegal and Mauritania respectively, makes some telling observations. The latest deal 
betwen Senegal and the EU covers the four year period between July 2002 and June 2006.and 
allows approximately 125 vessels access to Senegalese waters at an average cost to the EU of € 
128 000 per vessel. The total EU budget is € 64 million with 19 per cent having been earmarked 
for supporting measures such as monitoring resources, inspection, safety, support for small-
scale fisheries and auditing of partnership schemes such as the one between Senegal and Mauri-
tania. As there are no catch limits under the agreement, the commercial value of the deal cannot 
be calculated,124 though one may reasonably suspect that the commercial value far outweighs the 
fees paid. 
The fees charged per tonne of caught tuna, however, are only 2.5 to 4 per cent of the 
average commercial value. According to a report by the Court of Auditors in 2001, the 
average value of the catches under the Senegal agreement in 1993-1997 was € 24 mil-
lion, based on a catch of 24 729 tonnes (species unspecified). This can be compared with 
the annual cost of the previous agreement of € 12 million.125 
Furthermore, certain vessels are allowed to fish anywhere in the waters under Senegalese juris-
diction. In terms of by catches, however, limits and penalties are somewhat more rigid, as if by 
catches are exceeded penalties may entail the banning of certain vessels.136 Possibilities for 
catching demersal fish have also been decreased by 30 per cent under the new deal and net mesh 
sizes have been increased in view of reducing incidental catch rates There are also to be observ-
ers on EU vessels and 50 per cent of crewmembers must be Senegalese. However, a clause stat-
ing that any reduction of catch thresholds as a result of stock depletion will lead to a reduction 
of EU payments, gives Senegal little reason to respond to the deterioration in the state offish 
resources associated with EU activities within their fishery. Furthermore there is little informa-
tion on catch statistics under the new deal which makes it difficult to calculate bionomic equilib-
ria and economic benefits and losses. Ironically this is in stark contrast to EU domestic fisheries 
123 Charmes, J. (2004) Personal communication. Paris. 
124 Fisheries agreement with Senegal. wwvvAvwf.uk. p 8. 
125 Ibid, p 9. 
126 Ibid, p 10. 
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management schemes where catch levels are increasingly informed by TAC limits. In general, 
studies indicate that the latest set of EU fishing deals off Africa's West coast are rather poorly 
honed, where issues of monitoring and inspection appear a little 'patchy' which make it difficult 
to see how even the existing regulations may be enforced.128 Although this critique may not ad-
dress FOC fishing in the region explicitly, some important conclusions may be drawn from the 
nature of these deals with respect to the hope of eradicating FOC fishing as well as regulating 
licensed fishers more effectively. There appear to be two key issues here; the first is the absence 
of TAC and MSY estimates in the gauging of fishing limits, the second is the perceived inability 
of Senegalese authorities to manage and sanction even licensed operations with mandatory con-
trols and budget allocations for such activities. Indeed if TAC and MSY issues are of little im-
portance to Senegalese authorities with respect to existing deals, they are likely to be similarly 
unimportant or superfluous when it comes to the activities of FOC vessels. In addition to this, 
even if the concern apropos TAC and MSY limits was viewed as being significant, if unable to 
regulate even well known fishers, countries are likely to be equally poorly equipped to deal with 
FOC fishers 
As a fishery that is shared between states, the challenge of regulating fishing activity in Senegal 
in view of securing a healthy and sustainable migratory fish population has an added dimension. 
Indeed the problem of free riding may become a compelling one in the event of unilateral regula-
tion of the harvesting of these fish populations. Supposing that Senegal effects significant regu-
latory measures, while its northern neighbour Mauritania does not, the resultant welfare gains 
from Senegal's regulatory efforts will be shared between both Senegal and Mauritania at no cost 
to the northern nation. For this reason effective management offish populations which migrate 
between the borders of these two states requires significant collaboration, not only to exclude 
the possibility of free riding between states, but also to enhance the quality of information about 
the gross landings per population and the general state offish stocks. Although the prescriptions 
under Senegal and Mauritania's co-operation agreement have already been outlined in this re-
search, the problem of the inability of both the two states to effectively monitor their fisheries 
remains severe and important129 as such policies have little significance in the absence of the 
127 Ibid, p 11. 
128 Ibid, p 18. 
129 Mauritania and Senegal sign a fishing agreement. (1999) Loc cit 
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muscle required for enforcing their mandates. 
As we have seen over fishing is frequently seen to be in the rational best interests of even oth-
erwise benevolent individuals and groups, thus in the absence of a comprehensive plan to either 
restrict the activities of authorised fishers to those permitted by their contracts, or eradicate 
FOC vessels, there is unlikely to be substantial or meaningful reform in the industry. The eradi-
cation of these problems is not impossible. Despite being unable to find a single report of Sene-
galese authorities actually arresting a FOC vessel in terms of public international law, Senegal 
neighbouring states are well within their rights to arrest FOC vessels found within their waters 
and use the confiscated hardware and rent earned from its sale to regulate the industry. Such 
activities are justified under article 111(2) of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (UNCLOS) in terns of a state's right to enact particular regulations within its territo-
rial sea, as well as its right to arrest ships that are found to be in breach of certain regulations 13° 
It may also be feasible to use heavy sanctions against licensed fishers found to be acting in 
breach of their contracts to bolster regulatory infrastructures. Again reports of the implementa-
tion of such sanctions have proven elusive thus far. 
According to Bacar Fall, a Senegalese fisherman and member of the Federation of Fishing In-
dustry Interest Groups (FENAGIE), attempts to eradicate IUU fishing have been stifled for two 
main reasons. The first reason for this is corruption among fishing authorities, and the second is 
a lack of funds needed to monitor and control fishing activities in the area. According to Bacar 
Fall, the Senegalese government is in no position to check up on EU activities and skulduggery 
amongst licensing authorities and inspectors is rampant. The International Monetary Fund has 
supported such claims, suggesting that a major impediment to improved policy frameworks in 
Senegal are structural ones.131 In this case policy and enforcement frameworks are viewed as 
being insufficiently equipped at both conceptual and enforcement levels to deal with some of the 
state's policy challenges. As a result of dissatisfaction on the part of local fishers FENAGIE 
attempted to place its own inspectors on board EU vessels, but failed through lack of funds.132 
Although Amadeu Wade, a project coordinator for FENAGIE, suggests that his organisation is 
130 Akehurst, M. (1992)/4 modern inroduction to International Law. London, Roullcdge, p 184. 
131 Policy framework papers, www.imT.org. 
132 West African marine ecoregion: the local voice. (2000) www panda ore, p 1. 
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not opposed to the fishing agreements with the EU in general, they feel that the agreements 
could greatly enhance the sustainable usage of the resource if there was greater collaboration 
between government and themselves, and a more efficient coast-guarding authority and catch 
inspectorate. During the last set of negotiations with the EU, FEN AGE was only notified of, 
and included in, the first eight often rounds of negotiation, and had almost no say in the nature 
of the agreements.133 Furthermore, in the absence of external assistance Senegal's monitoring 
and regulatory infrastructures appear a little too modest. Yerim Tchoub, the Director General of 
the countries Fishery Protection and Supervision Department, acknowledges that their surveil-
lance infrastructure is insufficient for controlling even the activities of licensed foreign vessels 
effectively. He suggests that frequently large quantities of unreported by catch are dumped back 
into the sea, which distorts the department's statistical information apropos harvest levels and 
fish population levels. On the matter of regulatory infrastructures in Senegal Tchoub notes: 
My department is responsible for policing sea and river fisheries. Supervision is organ-
ised via maritime inspectors who carry out inspections on vessels in port and take part in 
missions at sea and using aeroplanes, supervising fishing operations. We are assisted by 
the National Navy and by a certain number of supervisory units, as well as by French 
forces based on the Cape Verde Islands. The support we receive from those forces is 
particularly valuable since the breakdown of our surveillance plane last June.134 
Indeed it may seem as if the Senegalese authorities have only a very loose grip on the reigns of 
their fishery resources. However despite worries about by catch and IUU fishing Senegalese 
authorities hold that the activities of foreign based fishing industries have a positive effect on the 
country's economy through stimulating industrial activities related to maritime functions and 
port operations.133 Ironically the distortions associated with IUU fishing make it impossible to 
effectively gauge the net gains and losses associated with the fishing activity, thus the net bene-
fits and incomes appreciated as a result of foreign fishing company activity in the region cannot 
be equated to the income losses associated with illegal and unreported fishing, or indeed the 
economic losses which may be emerging as a result of poorly honed policies. It is surely a com-
bination of such problems as inaccurate cost benefit analyses, corruption, bureaucratic failure, 
obstruction of power and slow policy processes that are at the root of Senegal's apparent ad-





cost benefit analyses provide little incentive to muster the political will to speed up fisheries pol-
icy processes. It is scarcely possible to hone policies aimed at streamlining distributional gains 
associated with fishing activity in the absence of an accurate accounting system reflecting gains 
and losses associated with fishery use. Effective accounting of fishery usage cannot be achieved 
in a fishery dominated by IUU fishing activities, which in turn cannot be eradicated without an 
effective structure to monitor ana control fishing activity. This in turn requires political com-
mitment and financial support. These requirements become especially challenging for a fishery 
like Senegal's where fish migrate between the boundaries of two or more states. Thus method-
ologies such as the one provided by Dupont and Phillips succumb to the unquantifiable impact 
of pirate fishing. The empirical estimates offish harvesting technology mandated in the first step 
of the model, and calculation of the employment and income losses associated with regulation 
proposals, prescribed in step two,136 are also made unattainable as a result of pirate fishing. Here 
again it is clear that the effectiveness of policies cannot be established when the same policies 
are being contravened by pirate fishing operations. It is also clear that estimates regarding the 
fish harvesting technologies being employed in a particular fishery will be made unreliable as a 
result of the secretive pirate operations. Hence the model becomes inapplicable to the two-state 
fishery faced by a pirate-fishing crisis. The need for a multilateral approach incorporating gov-
ernment and non-government organisations, and user groups is thus reinforced as a possible 
path toward sustainable fishery management in Senegal 
Perhaps the greatest tragedy associated with the inefficiency of Senegal's fishery policy, as well 
as that of other parts of West Africa, is that by failing to sanction IUU fishers effectively, the 
large foreign fishing enterprises achieve a comparative advantage in the production offish prod-
ucts. This is a result of the large scale and cost effective methods employed by these huge for-
eign fishing fleets, with little consideration given for the true economic costs incurred by their 
hosts. If Senegal and its coastal neighbours were to sanction foreign fishing operations in keep-
ing with the true economic costs associated with their activities, the cost of fishing would in-
crease for these vessels. Such a step would have the effect of reducing the comparative advan-
tage enjoyed by sometimes-exploitative foreign fleets, and placing local fishers in a stronger 
position in terms of world trade in fish products. Indeed this eventuality, like the streamlining of 
136 Dupont, D & Phipps, S. (2001). Loc cit. 
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fishery policies, impinges upon an improved fishery regulatory infrastructure in the region. 
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Chapter 5. A Market Instrument. 
5.1. A New Model. 
There are some key aspects to the international political economy of fishery management that 
must be considered in view of developing an appropriate approach to fishery regulation. The 
first relevant issue for this research is the one of illegal fishing on the high seas, or those parts of 
the ocean which do not fall under the jurisdiction of any state. Although this research does not 
deal with IUU fishing on the high seas explicitly, some of the results of the study may be gener-
alizable in a way that might be useful to high seas fishing dilemmas. The second concern is the 
issue of government subsidies for fishing fleets. These subsidies may at first glance appear to 
pose a serious threat to attempts at regulating a fishery by increasing the costs of fishing, how-
ever, as we shall see later improved regulation and implementation of licensing laws can be ef-
fective against unruly fishers despite government backing. This results from the fact that proper 
pricing of fishing licenses provides the necessary framework for eradicating irresponsible fishing 
practices independently of demand side price mechanisms. The next key consideration pertains 
to the constraints faced by states in the political south. These states have special needs and con-
strictions which must be considered in order to offer the best possible plan of action for improv-
ing fishery regulation regimes in developing states. These considerations are two fold; the first 
aspect bears on the budgetary constraints for fishery regulation and coast guarding, while the 
second pertains to the need to provide improved modalities for the economic emancipation of 
these states. 
Although much of the literature regarding IUU fishing strongly recommends the eradication of 
this phenomenon, through market controls, international law and the moral persuasion implicit 
in contemporary plans of action, these mechanisms may be ineffective or even unnecessary given 
a nuanced approach to fishery management. Indeed the moral persuasivity of international plans 
of action appears to be a soft argument in the face of the enormous impetus for free-riding be-
haviour. Secondly, international law offers only the very beginnings of a underdeveloped inter-
national system of governance in an international environment of sovereign states, and it may be 
some time before the system is sufficiently capable of dealing with the IUU fishing problem. 
Lastly, it would appear that in attempting to address fishery dilemmas using market mechanisms 
while simultaneously adhering to all of the principles of liberal trade and WTO rules is to un-
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dermine the integrity of regulatory plans. Although environmental prudence may be a growing 
characteristic of international trade, this does not make an argument for addressing environ-
mental concerns by using trade mechanisms which are based upon liberalizing controls rather 
than implementing them. Hence despite the developments that have been made in the field of 
IUU fishing, certain characteristics of international plans as well as constraints faced by policy 
makers may create arguments for new policy approaches to fishery management. 
It would appear that given the above-mentioned problems with current international status quos, 
regional bodies combining government and non-government appendages might provide worka-
ble solutions to IUU fishing dilemmas. Yet any such organization, government, non-government 
or mixed must follow certain protocols. First and foremost must come a means to evaluating the 
economic values offish stocks in order to provide impetus for further regulation, and indeed in 
order to provide a yardstick for sanction schemes. 
Key to ensuring the conservation of fishery resources is an effective method for quantifying the 
determinants of reservation prices, through establishing market prices that include the costs as-
sociated with the depletion of the resource. However, in the event of government subsidies on 
fishing activities, such demand and supply based logics may be obscured. Thus reservation 
prices may be utilised in a different way, where these price levels are manipulated through in-
creasing the cost of fishing by charging taxes or licensing fees, which aim to provide the neces-
sary revenue for regulating the fishery. At this price level, where the costs of regulation are fac-
tored into the cost of fishing, reservation prices of fishing will rise, and the impetus to fish more 
today will decrease. 
It is therefore conceivable that a solution to the problems connected to pirate fishing can be 
overcome. This section suggests a two tiered policy approach to fishery management which may 
have the effect of bringing about the sustainable use offish resources and an end to pirate fish-
ing. This approach involves a model which seeks to build accurate indicators which are accessi-
ble to the relevant authorities, regarding the amount and price offish being exchanged in the 
market place. This information is likely to facilitate the quantification of policy-related informa-
tion such as the reservation price of fishing. In addition, for the first time governments in pos-
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session of valuable fisheries may be capable of correctly estimating the economic losses associ-
ated with the depletion of those resources. 
The model impinges upon the liberalising of trade in fish products in the global market. Impor-
tantly, the two tiers of this approach must be inextricably connected in order for the model to 
yield accurate factor and product market indicators. 
The tiers aim to achieve the following: 
Tier 1. 
1. Knowledge about the quantities offish removed from a given fishery, including fisheries 
which span the territories of more than one state. 
2. Transparency regarding the rents earned from the sale of harvested fish products. 
3.Transparency regarding the costs incurred in harvesting fish. 
Tier 2. 
1. Information about the state offish populations. 
2. The installation of an independent coast guard authority for policing entire fisheries against 
pirate enterprises. 
Importantly, knowledge about the fish removed from each region must be counted collectively, 
or as per the fishery from which they were taken. This must be done in order to observe the 
effects of fishing on the entire fishery and not only that portion of the fishery which is found 
within the waters of a particular state. 
The objectives here are therefore to observe the amounts offish removed from a fishery in a 
given period, and aggregate the net economic benefits associated with this activity. The purpose 
of these measures is to provide a framework for accounting for the economic value of these 
resources in each period, hence informing states as to the potential present and future gained 
and lost earnings associated with the management of this precious resource. Information about 
the costs incurred in fishing are necessary in order to inform the prices of fishing licences ensur-
ing that the costs of compliance are not greater than the costs of non-compliance. Information 
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about the state of health of the fishery's fish population is necessary for ensuring that the level 
of fishing that is permitted accords with a biologically sustainable yield. An independent coast 
guard authority is required to keep pirate-fishing vessels out of the fishery, and to protect the 
interests of neighbouring states from overzealous exploitation of a shared fishery by another 
state. 
The first tier of this approach therefore involves the registration of all fishing industries (which 
operate above a designated output threshold) for a given fishery with a central trading authority, 
and the second requires the imposition of a tax based upon fish product sales which can be used 
to regulate the exploitation of fisheries, and eradicate pirate fishing. This regulation may be done 
in a number of ways. Ultimately though, regulation will require the employment of independent 
officials with designated tasks pertaining to mapping and policing the harvesting offish re-
sources. The rationale behind this approach is to ensure that all fish products are bought and 
sold in an open market in order to use market forces to gauge the demand and supply offish.131 
Simultaneously, demand and supply is carefully regulated by adjusting the costs of fishing 
through the pricing of licences and/or quota limits. Using the internet as a facilitator for this 
trading network will assist in making the market globally accessible, as well as making informa-
tion regarding the numbers and prices offish sold, easily obtained and mapped. This will enable 
the authorities responsible for regulating fishery use to estimate the monetary value of the fish-
ing permits sold, thus informing more accurately the value of such licences. Furthermore, infor-
mation about the number offish removed from various populations can inform quota restrictions 
in order for fisheries to be managed in accordance with their biological population equilibrium 
levels. 
Similar internet-based trade networks for fish products have proven successful in the past. In 
June 2001 the Australian Sydney Fish Market (SFM) began developing an electronic market-
place in the hope of capturing a larger share of the world's market for fish products. The result 
of this endeavour has been a terrific commercial success, enhancing the efficiency of the SFM,13* 
and providing evidence that similar systems may provide workable solutions for other fisheries. 
137 Parian, M. (1993) Loc cit 
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The second tier of this model involves sanctioning fishing activities by means of mandatory 
taxes, tariffs, or ITQ's for fishing activities within a particular fishery, the revenue from which 
may be used to fund the policing of fisheries against piracy. Such natural resource taxes have 
been implemented in the past where a resource is required to generate some additional revenue 
for the authorities which oversee their usage.139 In this case effective coast guarding results in 
the eradication of illegitimate fishing enterprises, and giuaier certainty among the buyers and 
sellers of fishing quotas and licences that they get their just deserts free from the capital leakages 
characteristic of fisheries in which pirate fishing is rampant. 
Fishing will ultimately be operating in accordance with the true cost, through incorporating into 
fishing costs, the prices of quotas and licences The prices of the latter will be informed by the 
reservation price of fishing for that particular fishery. The implementation of this model makes 
the forecasting of the problematic determinants of reservation prices more possible through the 
provision of important information regarding some of the more enigmatic variables; namely the 
expected future price of the resource, the expected future cost of fishing, and the optimal level 
of harvest. Necessarily the full implementation of the model will make estimations about the 
potential for the rehabilitation of the resource sharper. Although this model does not explicitly 
provide values for each determinant of reservation prices, the extensive monitoring of the use of 
the fishery associated with its implementation provides much of the foundation material for ap-
proximating such values. Furthermore, by providing accurate information apropos the quantity 
offish removed per session, the model offers a fine foundation for the estimation of values such 
as the OSY and MSY for a given fishery 
In view of the Hecksher Olin theory of international trade, the ramifications of the implementa-
tion of this model become somewhat exciting in the developing context. Indeed one of the chief 
concerns for fishery bodies in many parts of the political South is how to redistribute rent gains 
from fishing in a way that is more favourable to smaller local industries and user groups. Fur-
thermore the export offish resources may be viewed as a potentially lucrative means to improv-
ing balance of payment problems. Supposing that the regulatory model proposed above man-
138 Sydney Fish Market casts its online net, (2003) www .diim.nsw.gov.au. ,pp 1 -3. 
139Joffe, R(2003). State open to talks on royalty tax measures. Johannesburg, Business Day 02/05/2003, p 1. 
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ages to align the costs of fishing with the true cost of ensuring the long term sustainability of the 
resource. In other words, supposing the model succeeds in incorporating the costs of effective 
regulation into the costs of fishing, then local fishers may find themselves in a more favourable 
position apropos comparative advantages. Indeed the efficiency of large scale fishing operations 
may be something to be reckoned with, but given advantages enjoyed by local fishers such as 
geographical proximity to the resource, the absence of a need to freeze fish for long periods, 
and perhaps slightly more lenient licensing fees, small local fishing companies are likely to find 
themselves in a favourable position in terms of producing fish products with a comparative ad-
vantage. Hence, as Hecksher and Ohlin might suggest, by increasing the costs of fishing for for-
eign trawlers, local fishers are well placed to engage in international trade in fish products from 
a stronger position by virtue of an implicit comparative advantage. It is this advantage which has 
been perverted by ineffective regulatory controls and poorly tuned licensing measures. Thus re-
arranging taxing and licensing protocols for certain fisheries may not only yield the long term 
sustainability of the resource, but also provide a vehicle for uplifting local industries and improv-
ing export levels and balance of payments problems. It is important to note that the objective of 
raising the cost of fishing is not explicitly to elicit a demand side decrease in the quantity offish 
demanded by invoking a price increase, but rather to provide a means to retrieving funds re-
quired for the effective management of a fishery. Hence in the case of a fishing industry which is 
heavily subsidised by a government or governments, the price offish may remain relatively low 
to the household consumer, while the costs of extracting the resource have aligned with the 
costs of ensuring the long term sustainability of the resource, thus increasing the reservation 
price of fishing and creating an incentive to save fishing effort today for fishing effort tomorrow 
(and the next day). 
5.2. Senegal and the Model. 
In order to apply this model to the case of the Senegalese fishery we must first take into ac-
count some of the characteristics faced by this fishery. Indeed it may seem that the obvious 
problems for the Senegalese fishery are the prevalence of IUU fishing, and an apparent shortage 
of regulatory muscle. However, there are other important characteristics that should not be dis-
counted, such as the shared nature of this fishery, comprising fish populations which migrate 
between the EEZ's of both Senegal and its northern neighbour Mauritania. Likewise we must 
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consider the pressures faced by small user groups on the countries coast line, and the associated 
economic pressures that the increasing pressure on this resource is placing on the country's al-
ready fragile economy. Additionally, one may consider that the IUU fishing problem in Senegal 
is not restricted to FAC fishing per se, but to a broader based problem of over-fishing and miss-
exploitation of the fishery by legal foreign-based enterprises as well as local ones. 
In terms of a Hardin's tragedy of the commons dilemma the state of Senegal's fishery may be 
illustrated by figure 4.1 (below), which has been adapted from the previous chapter. In this 
game, the fishery is faced by a status quo in which both legal users A and B are committing 
tragedy of the commons indiscretions, while user P fishes in a completely illegal, unreported and 
unregulated manor. Using information from Senegalese surveillance efforts (which suggest that 
on certain days as many as half of the ships in the country's waters are flying flags of conven-
ience) to inform the variables used in this figure, one may reasonably suggest that fishers de-
noted by P extract a quantity equitable to Q = 10 (a little less than half of the quantity removed 
by so called legitimate fishers.) 
Game theoretic fishery modality. 
Figure 4.1. 
F A. B. P. 
Q 12 12 10 
SC -7 -7 
AC = 14 
Suppose now that the Senegalese fishery authorities simultaneously implement the first two tiers 
of the model, in accordance with the Mauritanian authorities. Acting in tangent the results of 
this cooperative policy compliance in two-country environment produces some interesting re-
sults. Whereas formerly the two-country model provided some problems associated with com-
peting interests apropos policy implementation, the cooperative approach yields an unusual and 
new outcome. Figure 5.1 below illustrates a point in the world market for fish products at which 
the supply offish products shows a broad based affect of multilateral policy compliance. Where 
formerly markets for fish products based on Senegalese and Mauritanian fish products may have 
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settled at an equilibrium position where licence prices accounted for approximately 2.5 to 4 per 
cent of the fish's commercial value (at P3, Q3) the advent of co-operation between the two 
states, creates a new equilibrium of P4, Q4 where licences account for a greater portion of the 
commercial value offish products thus slowly pushing prices upward. At this point both coun-
tries in the two-country environment have implemented similar policy controls over fishing ac-
tivities, l he result of this behaviour has been to lower the harvest rate and supply offish prod-
ucts, which leads to a corresponding increase in the price for fish products. Ironically the 
catastrophic state of global fish populations facilitates this cooperation by way of the resultant 
supply deficit which places the producers offish products in a stronger position to bargain for 
more rigid policy measures. Now by forming an alliance in this situation of a supply deficit, 
Senegal and Mauritania might use their proximity to their advantage. 
In this case, FOC and other forms of IUU fishing will be virtually eradicated by stricter controls, 
while the new fish sales monitoring system provides the basis for monitoring the activities of 
fishers inside the shared fishery, but outside of Senegal's EEZ. In this way Senegal may not only 
be able to forecast more effectively the biologically sustainable fishing levels for their fishery, 
but also will be able to better estimate the economic value of this resource as well as some of 
the possible costs of misregulation. By adjusting tax incentives and disincentives, and the quan-
tity and price of licences or quota restrictions, fishery authorities may be able to bring the costs 
of fishing into line with the costs of ensuring the sustainability of the resource. In this way costs 
of fishing will rise, while, and importantly, IUU fishing will be restricted to reasonable levels by 
rigid and effective coast guarding and monitoring of fishing activities. The results of this will be 
to reduce AC to nearly zero, and to eradicate the presence of fisher P. Now A and B may be 
able to harvest fish in a sustainable and fair way. In this way MSY and equilibrium catch func-
tions, as represented by a product of Yield Effort (YE) in figure 6.1, may shift into sync. 
With respect to the most recent deals between Senegal and Mauritania and the EU the most 
important factors to consider are that licence prices and catch restrictions are in no way in-
formed by MSY estimates. Hence catch limits are not determined by TAC estimations as they 
should be, but rather by the willingness of fishing companies to pay for excess tonnage offish 
caught. Given that estimations suggest that the cost charged per tonne of certain species under 
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current agreements lies somewhere between 2.5 and 4 per cent of the commercial value per 
tonne, it would seem that using willingness to pay for extra tonnages as a means to restricting 
catch levels is hardly reliable. The need to manage deals in accordance with MSY and TAC lev-
els is therefore enormous as such limits act as a means to limiting fishing effort. 
Figure 5.1 The effect of policy compliance in a two-country environment 
Q4 Q3 Quantity (x) x 
(From Frieden, J & Lake, D. p 440) 
The figure below shows how adjusting fishing effort in a fishery by way of licensing and or tax 
restriction can cause fishing levels to come into line with sustainable yield levels. The fishery 
depicted here reflects the Senegalese as being exploited at a point above the equilibrium catch 
function on YE1 in the absence of regulation, the implementation of effective policy controls 
causes a downward shift in fishing effort to the interception of YE2 and the equilibrium catch 
function. At this point fishing may be sustained indefinitely 
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Figure 6.1 Equilibrium Catchand Yield-Effort 
functions for a fishery. 
uilibrium catch 
(From Khan, J. (1995)) 
Fish population (x) 
Now fish populations may slowly correct themselves as harvest rates decrease and fish popula-
tion growth rates increase. Figure 7.1 illustrates this shift, where catch rates have been reduced 
to C2 at a population level of X2, with the resultant increase in growth represented by G3 at a 
growing population level of X3. Ultimately, sustained growth in the fish population, resulting 
from lowered catch rates, may allow the population to reach a suitable level, where the MS Y 
may be economically lucrative. This end-goal point is shown by C4, G4 at a population size of 
X4, where catch and population growth rates are equal at the greatest possible level of exploita-
tion for the fishery. 
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Figure 7.1 Harvest and fish population growth rates. 





X4 X3 X2 K i 
Population (x) 
(From Khan, J. (1995)) 
Unfortunately the unavailability of information about the Senegalese fish populations makes it 
impossible to provide meanignfiil MSY and YE estimations. This comes as the result of the lack 
of fishing quotas and accurate accounts of catch levels in the region, thus rendering the two 
graphs used above instructive in a theoretical sense only. 
Ultimately the implementation of this model brings the Senegalese fishery to the status quo 
represented by figure 8.1, shown again below, where fishers A and B fish at equilibrium levels in 
the absence of illegal fisher P. Importantly, in this new case AC is equal to 0 and the rent seek-
ing impulses of fishers are tempered by an effective regulatory authority. 
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Game theoretic outcomes of effective fishery 
management. 
Figure 8.1. 
¥ A. R 
Q 10 10 
SC -0 -0 
AC = 0 
Again the unavailability of reliable information with regard to the state of the Senegalese fishery 
and catch rates within it makes accurate estimations bearing on the figures above somewhat 
difficult. However in a hypothetical sense, having achieved the basic goal of protecting the fish-
ery from the threat posed by IUU fishing, plans such as those suggested by Dupont and Phipps 
may be implemented in view of fine tuning some of the smaller details pertaining to the political 
economy of the fishery, such as welfare gains between user groups, and other such redistribu-
tion benefits bearing on adjusting tax and wage rates, and other such variables. In this way the 
usage of this fishery may take some important steps toward not only being bionomically sustain-
able but more economically efficient. Furthermore such plans make the benefits of rearranging 
tax and licensing structures more in tune with those hinted at by Hecksher and Ohlin in view of 
maximising comparative advantages in the production of internationally traded goods. 
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Chapter 6. Conclusion and Recommendations. 
Concepts such as sustainable development and ecological modernisation, which aim to marry 
economic development to ecologically sustainable practices, can be credited with at least high-
lighting those ecological issues having some bearing upon developmental ones. This advent 
comes in spite of the often vague or unclear nature of the definitions used by those purporting to 
adhere to these concepts in the public and private policy environment. However, Anthony Gid-
dens argues that there have been two key oversights with regard to these concepts: 
The somewhat comfortable assumptions of ecological modernisation deflect attention 
from two fundamental questions raised by ecological considerations: our relationship to 
scientific advance, and our response to risk.140 
The relationship between scientific advance, risk and the political processes which govern the 
nature of their relativity has illustrated some issues which are central to the research questions 
for this thesis. The case of the Senegalese IUU fishing dilemma shows that, in this case, the ac-
tors who are employing their technological muscle close to its fullest potential are fishers with 
little concern for the risks associated with the long-term depletion of Senegal's oceanic fish 
population. The lack of concern for scientific information and technological advances which 
might enhance the regulation of the fisher, on the part of the relevant policy makers in the region 
clearly shows a similar disregard for the risks associated with the depletion of these important 
fish stocks. As the author has argued this alarming situation is surely due to an array of factors, 
the most important of which are the ineffective and dishonest cost-benefit analyses used to 
gauge the welfare gains and losses associated with the harvesting of the country's fish stocks. 
In the absence of significant scientific information on fishery population health, and mechanisms 
for the regulation of Senegal's offshore fishery, this research has had three core aims. These 
aims have been to explore the reasons for the lackadaisical approach to the risks associated with 
the depletion of Senegal's fish resources on the part of the country's important policy figures, 
and to help to provide both the political impetus and economic mechanisms required to invoke 
and see through a more risk averse attitude toward fishing activities in Senegal 
To this extent this research has aimed to accord the price offish in the marketplace with the 
price level which is true to the cost of fishing, including the long-term costs associated with the 
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future availability of the resource. Combining the invisible hand of the free market and rigid 
regulatory policy controls provides the necessary incentives and disincentives for supplying and 
purchasing fish products, therefore providing the monetary means to eliminating practices that 
are economically inefficient and conducive to the over-exploitation of the fishery. Furthermore, 
greater technological support for mandating and monitoring catch thresholds will provide policy 
makers with a more accurate sense of the losses associated with over, or uncontrolled fishing. 
Accurate and insightful policy implementation, as advocated by Diane Dupont and Shelly Phil-
lips may be afforded the opportunity to have a gradual but beneficial effect for artisan fishing 
communities. These communities hopefully, will not only enjoy the fruits of the rehabilitation of 
fishery populations as a result of a more efficient fishery regulation program and the eradication 
of pirate fishing but also enjoy the benefits of policy approaches that for the first time can accu-
rately take into account their orientation within the distributional outcomes of policy adop-
*i~~ MI tion. 
The incidental effect of the implementation of this model is to make the information required for 
policy appraisal accessible to those developing states that are subject to the distorting effects of 
pirate fishing. Such a policy approach to the management of fisheries suffering from pirate fish-
ing may indeed provide the blueprint for a status quo in international fishing regime which is 
sufficiently sensitive to some of Kahn's transcendental concerns. Considerations such as those 
pertaining to incidental catch, the pollution of marine fisheries, and conflicts between user 
groups may be extinguished through effective monitoring and policing of fishing practices com-
bined with policy approaches which secure bionomic sustainabilhy for fishery resources. 
The solutions to IUU fishing in the developing context proposed within this thesis are, however, 
not without a sense of irony. As was argued earlier, it is not easy for developing states to tighten 
fishing restrictions, particularly when such actions may jeopardise renewal of fishing deals 
States may therefore be compelled to avoid making fishing regulations within their EEZ's 
stricter than those of their neighbours. However, such states may be presented with the perfect 
window of opportunity to implement more rigid policy controls as a result of the barren state of 
140 Giddens. A. (1998) The third way: the renewal of social democracy. New York, Polity Press, p 58. 
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global fisheries. Hence the supply deficit for fish stocks places states in possession of those 
stocks in a stronger bargaining position when it comes to regulating the exploitation of that re-
source. The scarcity offish decreases competition on the supply side but increases on the de-
mand side. This gives suppliers (states in ownership offish resources) an opportunity to increase 
the stringency of their regulatory measures with relatively little risk of being out-competed by 
other suppliers. Indeed one possible situation would see suppliers come together to agree on 
sustainable and appropriate regulatory measures, which may inevitably incorporate an increase 
in the costs of fishing for those demanding access to fish resources. Perhaps problematically this 
situation could lead to a fisheries cartel or monopoly held by states that run their fisheries in a 
sustainable way. The ramifications of this scenario can only be guessed at at this stage though. 
The second irony which is implicit in the recommendations of this research is perhaps more 
compelling than the first. Although suggesting that the costs of fishing need to be raised to a 
level that can incorporate the sustainable usage of the resource may seem like a necessary meas-
ure given the state of global fish stocks in the absence of such a plan, this plan may indeed have 
a negative efifect upon the starving populations of the world. Even if third states in possession of 
fishery resources manage to rearrange international trade and fishing sanction schemes in favour 
of providing themselves with a comparative advantage in the production of and trade and trade 
in fish products, the likely increase in the price offish associated with more efficient regulation 
of the resource may make fish proteins inaccessible to the poor and hungry peoples of the 
world. Such a development would have the effect of reinforcing dependencies on international 
monetary and food aid. In response to this problem one may only suggest that fishery regulation 
policies are fine tuned in such a way as to provide sufficient welfare gains to the poorer inhabi-
tants of fishery states. A possible solution to this dilemma may be to sanction large-scale indus-
trial fishers more heavily than small artisanal fleets, thus allowing artisanal fishers to fish at a 
comparatively low cost, enabling them to sell fish products at an affordable market price. It 
would be a tremendous tragedy if the findings of this research made fish products inaccessible to 
the poor peoples of Senegal who may find themselves unable to afford the higher prices de-
manded for fish as a result of greater regulatory stringency and the imposition of license and 
quota measures. For this reason it may be useful to examine the possibilities for a system which 
141 DupontD. APhipps, A (2001) Op cit, p 214 
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favours large scale and highly efficient industrial trawlers more heavily than small artisanal fish-
ers. Such a system may make it possible to regulate a fishery at a macro level while allowing 
micro fishing industries to subsist and continue to provide fish products to local people at more 
favourable price levels. This is not to say that artisanal fleets should be allowed to fish without 
restriction, but rather to suggest that such small scale fishing companies should be subject to 
certain concessions apropos licensing costs. Indeed policy makers may wish to address a num-
ber of concerns with regard to artisanal fleets. Such considerations may range from protected 
areas, fishing techniques, protected species to biological rest periods and catch levels, however, 
a key difference between the policy treatment of small scale fishers as opposed to their industrial 
counterparts must encompass sanction levels that accord with the income and efficiency, or re-
turns to fishing effort enjoyed by respective fishing enterprises. Indeed it is most likely that large 
industrial fishers enjoy far higher returns for their fishing effort than smaller artisanal fleets, 
hence it may be in the best socioeconomic interests of the state's policy providers to recognise 
these differences and adjust policy treatments accordingly. A plan like this may for example en-
compass the scaling of license prices and quota restrictions according to gross tonnage for par-
ticular species, regions or fishing techniques. Measures like this would however depend tremen-
dously upon the specificity of the constraints which characterise fishing activities within different 
quantity, species, methodological and regional sectors, each with a specific variety of recom-
mended policy protocols. The result of such a plan may be to provide the basis for eradicating 
IUU fishing and streamlining the economic efficiency of fishing activity in a given fishery, while 
providing for the nutritional and socio-economic interests of the less formal fishing sectors and 
their dependants 
In an exploratory way this thesis has been restricted by the severe shortage of information on 
the state of Senegal's fish population and fishing industry. This no doubt results from the coun-
try's stake holders' lax attitudes toward the associated risks of fishery resource depletion. As it 
appears, such figures are unavailable as neither statistical accountability nor catch thresholds are 
mandated by current Senegalese fishing agreements. Although the study has provided a model 
for improving the ecological and economic sustainability of fishing operations in Senegal, its 
main contribution must emerge from its resultant recommendations. In retrospect of this re-
search process, one may be able to say with some authority that the well being offish resources 
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in the area will only come as a result of greater efforts to understand the health of the fish popu-
lation and to adjust fisheries policies accordingly. This insight creates recommendations for both 
action and further research. On the one hand action is required on the part of Senegalese fishery 
policy makers to set catch restrictions and mandate stringent recording of catches. On the other 
hand, if this resource is to be exploited at maximum efficiency, further research is required to 
examine and suggest the status quos that are necessary in order to achieve this efficiency. Im-
portantly, if catch levels and fish population health are to be understood in view of improving 
efficiency apropos the exploitation of Senegal's ocean fishery, IUU fishing must be eradicated as 
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